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WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT MALPRACTICE SE7TLEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
Critics of malpractice law contend that the civil justice system is an
irrational lottery in which a plaintiff's chance of receiving a substantial
settlement has nothing to do with the defendant's fault. President George
W. Bush stated the charge this way:
Doctors and hospitals realize . . . it's expensive to fight a lawsuit,
even if it doesn't have any merit. And because the system is so
unpredictable, there is a constant risk of being hit by a massive jury
award. So doctors end up paying tens of thousands, or even
hundreds of thousands of dollars to settle claims out of court, even
when they know they have done nothing wrong.'
Is this claim correct? Its strongest empirical support comes from the
1996 findings of the Harvard Medical Practice Study ("Harvard Study").2
This study concluded that the merits of a malpractice claim have no bearing
on the likelihood of a settlement.3 The authors of the study even suggested
that the entire adjudicative process is "an expensive sideshow."4
The widespread reliance of both tort critics and the media on this single
study is unfortunate. Its findings are decidedly inconsistent with the
growing body of empirical data that researchers have accumulated over the
past two decades. Taken as a whole, these studies demonstrate that
6settlement outcomes are driven by the strength of the plaintiff's case. Weak
claims fare worst, toss-ups do better, and strong claims fare best. Although
• • 7
the fit is not perfect, it is surprisingly good.
1. TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 12-13 (2005) (quoting President
George W. Bush, Speech in Collinsville, Ill. (Jan. 2005)).
2. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes of
Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963, 1963 (1996). See generally HARVARD
MED. PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK (1990).
3. Brennan et al., supra note 2, at 1963, 1966-67.
4. Id. at 1967.
5. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE? 388 (1997) (stating, based on this study, that "[tihe system seems broken from both
ends"); CAROLE R. GRESENZ ET AL., RAND CORPORATION, A FLOOD OF LITIGATION? PREDICTING
THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGING LEGAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO ERISA BENEFICIARIES 5
(1999), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/isstiepapers/2006/IP184.PDF (citing the study
for proof that "[sleverity of injury plays a strong role in determining the liability, however, and
may even overshadow the effect of the presence or absence of negligence in a significant
number of cases"); Common Good, Selected Malpractice Claim Data, http://cgood.org/
healthcare-reading-cgpubs-factsheets-14.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2007) (citing the study for the
proposition that outcomes correlate with injuries, not with quality of care).
6. See infra Part 1.
7. See infta Part I.A, p. 114 tbl.1.
1785
HeinOnline  -- 92 Iowa L. Rev. 1785 2006-2007
92 IOWA LA WREVIEW
Remarkably, however, scholars and policymakers continue to understate
the strength and consistency of the correlation between negligence and
settlement outcome.8 Some of that misunderstanding probably stems from
the unfavorable findings in the Harvard Study. Some is due to the absence
of widespread knowledge about the favorable findings of the overall body of
settlement research. Only Tom Baker, a prominent professor and scholar in
this field, has attempted to collect those findings and to examine their
implications. However, his important summary of the research did not
attempt to quantify the cumulative findings of the studies or to identify the
patterns revealed by them. Nor did he offer a theory to explain the research
findings. This Article takes up those tasks.
When examined in detail, the research data support several important
hypotheses, none of which support the suspicions that malpractice
settlements are irrational. Weak claims are much less likely to result in a
settlement payment than strong claims. Only 10% to 20% of the weak cases
result in a payment, and it is typically only a token amount, such as
forgiveness of any unpaid doctor bills. Strong cases settle at a much higher
rate (85% to 90%) and for a much larger average payment. Borderline cases
fall in the middle.
The evidence that defendants avoid payment in the great majority of
weak cases and settle the rest for highly discounted amounts means that the
settlement rate, standing alone, is a misleading indicator of the problem of
"erroneous" payments. In addition, the data indicate that defendants are
able to extract similar advantages in their settlement of borderline cases.
They make settlement payments in approximately half of these cases and
then pay a highly discounted amount in the cases they decide to settle. This
amounts to a double discount and results in a payment below the expected
value of the claim. Although the data do not permit a similarly confident
statement about the resolution of strong malpractice claims, the data hint
that they too are settled for less than expected value. The ability of
malpractice defendants to settle cases below expected value suggests that
defendants have a marked superiority in bargaining power. In turn, that
superiority enables them to obtain settlements that are more favorable than
are justified by the merits.10
The superior bargaining power possessed by malpractice defendants
probably has several sources. These sources include superior risk tolerance,
better access to information, more-experienced attorneys and insurance
representatives, easier access to expert witnesses, and the incentive to fight
8. See supra note 5 (citing scholars' reactions to the Harvard study).
9. BAKER, supra note 1, at 1963; Tom Baker, Reconsidering the Harvard Medical Practice Study
Conclusions About the Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33J. L. MED. & ETHICS 501, 502, 509-
11(2005).
10. See infta Part II.
[200711786
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low-odds claims vigorously. Defendants probably gain additional
bargaining power from the fact that malpractice claims are very hard to win
at trial, even with strong evidence of negligence. As a result, the data
strongly contradict the popular assumption that the settlement process is
unfair to defendants.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the findings of the
principal studies regarding medical malpractice settlements. Part II
synthesizes those findings and explores their implications, paying special
attention to the likelihood of double discounting. Part III identifies the
likely sources of the defendants' superior bargaining power. The Article
concludes by suggesting that the Harvard Study was an outlier, that
settlement outcomes are closely tied to the quality of claims, and that the
departures from this pattern favor defendants more often than they favor
plaintiffs.
I. THE STUDIES
Over the past three decades, more than a dozen studies have examined
the relationship between the strength of a plaintiff's malpractice claim and
the eventual settlement of her case. The resulting body of data amply
justifies a search for patterns and policy implications. This Article
undertakes that search.
The studies can be usefully subdivided according to the sensitivity with
which they rated the quality of care given to the patient.13 Most of the studies
divided the claims into three or more categories, e.g., negligent, not
negligent, and uncertain. A few studies, however, used only two categories,
e.g., negligent or not negligent. This difference proved material. The two-
category studies showed a much weaker correlation between negligence and
settlement outcome than the three-category studies. As this Article will
explain, the weaker correlation is a predictable consequence of the two-
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part III.C.
13. For this synthesis, the studies could have been organized in several different ways.
First, the studies could have been classified according to the method used to determine
whether or not the patient's malpractice claim had merit. Some studies have relied on the
opinions provided to liability insurers by physicians retained specifically to evaluate the strength
of the plaintiffs claim, while one study relied on the ratings provided by the hospital's risk
managers. The best studies attempted to minimize bias by asking independent physicians to
rate the quality of care given to the claimant. Second, the studies could be distinguished by the
completeness of the information made available to the reviewers. Ratings that are given soon
after the claim is made, especially those based entirely on the patient's medical records, are
more likely to be inconsistent with the eventual resolution of the case than those rendered
closer to the time of settlement. Although these different rating methods could be important in
some circumstances, the studies using these methods have yielded surprisingly similar findings
about the correlation between the medical negligence and settlement outcome. See infra p. 120
tbl.1, p. 121 tbl.2, p. 124 fig.4. As a result, I have not chosen to subdivide the studies on these
bases.
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category design. 14 As a result, the number of categories used by the study is
an attribute that must be taken into account when drawing conclusions from
the cumulative data. To set the stage for that analysis, the literature review
that follows discusses the two sets of studies separately.
A. THREE-CA TEGORY STUDIES
In eight of the settlement studies, the researchers used three categories
to rate the quality of care given to the patient by the defendant physician. All
eight found a direct correlation between the quality of care rendered and
the likelihood of a settlement payment. Only three of these eight studies
tested the relationship between quality of care and settlement size, and they
reached conflicting conclusions. The studies are discussed in the order of
their sample size, except when multiple studies were done by the same
authors.
1. Taragin et al.
In the largest of the malpractice-settlement studies, Mark Taragin and
his colleagues examined 8,231 claims made against doctors insured by a
physician-owned NewJersey company between 1977 and 1992. 5 As a part of
that company's claims procedure, whenever the claims representative had
harbored any doubts about the defensibility of a claim, a review of the claim
was performed by a physician chosen from a panel of volunteers from the
same medical specialty.' 6 The insurance company's expert reviewer
discussed the case with the "claims representative, the defense attorney, and
the defending physician" before giving his evaluation.'7 In orthopedic and
neurosurgery cases, a panel of outside physicians was employed and a
majority vote determined the rating of defensibility. 18
After examining the disposition of these claims, the authors found a
significant association between negligence and the probability of
settlement.' 9 The plaintiff received a settlement payment in 91% of the cases
14. See infra Part I.B.
15. Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the
Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780, 780 (1992). About 80%
of these claims ultimately resulted in a lawsuit. See id. at 783 tbl.2 (showing that a total of 1,654
cases were resolved before suit was filed). Physician care was considered defensible in 62% of
the claims, indefensible in 25% of the claims, and unclear in 13% of the claims. Id. at 781, 781
tbl. 1.
16. See id. at 780-81. At the outset, the defendant physician was contacted. Id. at 780. The
claim was deemed "indefensible" if the physician admitted error. Id. If the physician did not
admit error, then a claims representative reviewed the claim. Id. If the claims representative
concluded that the claim was "clearly defensible," then no further review was performed. Id. If
he concluded otherwise, then external review was performed. Id. at 780-81.
17. Id. at 781.
18. Id.
19. Id. (finding a significance level of P<0.001).
1788 [20071
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where medical care was judged to be negligent, in 59% of the cases where
liability was unclear, and in 21% of the cases in which the medical care was
defensible. ' ° The correlation between care quality and settlement size was
also positive but was not statistically significant.
2
'
The authors concluded, "The defensibility of the case and not the
severity of patient injury predominantly influences whether any payment is
made. . . . Our findings suggest that unjustified payments are probably
uncommon." 2 They reached this conclusion despite the finding that
payment had been made in 21% of the "defensible" cases.23 The authors
attributed this discrepancy to their rating process:
First, the determination about physician care was made very early
after a claim was generated and may have been inaccurate as more
information became available. Second, a physician-based review
process may be biased toward assessing physician performance in
the physician's favor. Third, the insurance company may err toward
an initial determination of physician care as defensible to avoid
unnecessary settlement payments.2
4
As a consequence, they concluded that unwarranted payments were
uncommon.
2. Farber and White (2 Studies)
In their 1991 study, Henry Farber and Michelle White examined the
files of 252 lawsuits filed between 1977 and 1989 against a single large
25hospital. In each case, the hospital asked multiple experts to determine
whether the professional standard of care had been met by the defendant.
26
The experts who provided these evaluations included the supervising
physicians, other hospital physicians in the relevant specialty, and
independent physicians.27 Care was coded as "good" or "bad" only if all the
20. Taragin et al., supra note 15, at 781. In addition, severity of injury had a small, but
statistically significant, association with the likelihood of payment. Id. (revealing frequency of
payment at 39% for low severity, 43% for medium severity, and 47% for high severity).
21. Id. at 781 (finding a significance level of P=0.16).
22. Id. at 780.
23. Id. at 780-82.
24. Id. at 782. In addition, roughly half of the cases in which the medical care was deemed
defensible were reviewed only by a claims representative, while all initial determinations of poor
quality were reviewed by other doctors. Id. at 781 tbl.1 (showing that 29% of the cases were
deemed defensible with "no peer review"). This asymmetry in the evaluation procedure could
bias the ratings in favor of defendants.
25. Henry S. Farber & MichelleJ. White, Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the
Litigation Process, 22 RANDJ. ECON. 199, 203 (1991).
26. Id. at 204.
27. Id.
1789
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experts agreed on this assessment.21 Care was rated as "ambiguous" if the
reports were ambiguous or divided.29
When Farber and White compared the quality-of-care rating with
outcomes of the cases, they found "a strong relationship between care
quality and disposition." Settlements were least likely when the care
received by the claimant was judged to be "good" (24.2%) . Settlements
were more likely when the quality of care provided to the patient was rated
32as uncertain (68.9%). Most likely to settle were the cases of "bad" care-
over 89% of these cases ended with a settlement.
33
Care quality also significantly influenced settlement size, though much
34less than severity of injury. The mean settlement was $14,109 for a case
with good care, $146,160 for ambiguous care, and $203,209 for bad care.
The hospital's payments were between fifteen and twenty-five times higher
when care quality was bad versus when it was good, depending on the
36predictive model used. Because their data showed such a strong
relationship between care quality and tort outcomes, the authors concluded
that "the negligence system provides a substantial incentive for high-quality
medical care."3 7
In a later study, Farber and White examined a larger sample of files
from the same hospital over roughly the same time period and confirmed
their earlier findings.38 Fault was significantly associated with the probability
of payment.3 9 It was also significantly associated with settlement amount. 40
28. Id. at 204-05.
29. Id.
30. Farber & White, supra note 25, at 205 (finding a significance level of P<0.0001). Of the
252 cases, ninety-two were dropped or dismissed (36.5%), 147 cases were settled out of court
(58.3%), and thirteen went to a verdict (5.2%). Id.
31. Id. at 204 tbl.1, 205.
32. Id. at 204 tbl.1.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 206 (stating that 40% of the variance was explained by severity and 8% by fault).
35. Farber & White, supra note 25, at 215 tbl.7.
36. Id. at 214, 215 tbl.7. The mean log settlement, using good care as the base, was 0.93
(.466) for cases with ambiguous care and 1.54 (.448) in cases with bad care. Id. at 206, 207 tbl.3.
37. Id. at 214.
38. Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute
Resolution in Medical Malpractice, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 777, 777-79 (1994). Farber and White looked
at the files of 355 complaints made to a single large hospital between 1976 and 1989 concerning
the hospital or its providers (half of which were resolved without a lawsuit) and the files of 242
additional disputes initiated by the filing of a lawsuit. ld. at 786. The researchers had available
to them the files of the hospital's patient-relations office and its legal-affairs office, including
the opinions of the experts the hospital asked to assess the quality of medical care. Id. at 786-
87. When informal complaints were received, the hospital got an evaluation from a supervisor
or provider in the same specialty. Id. When lawsuits were filed, the hospital also retained outside
experts. Id. at 787.
39. d. at 798, 799 tbl.8. The coefficient, using good care as the constant, for ambiguous
care was 1.69 (.245), and for bad care, the coefficient was 2.75 (.245). Id. at 799 tbl.8.
1790 [20071
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Using a predictive economic model developed by the authors to standardize
their findings, the predicted settlement amounts were $7112 for good-
quality care, $91,008 for ambiguous-quality care, and $177,320 for bad-
41quality care.
Farber and White found these strong correlations despite their use of a
rating process that was probably biased in favor of malpractice defendants
because it sometimes relied on co-workers to evaluate the quality of care
rendered by the defendant.
42
3. Ogburn et al.
Paul Ogburn and his colleagues examined 220 claims of obstetrical
negligence filed between 1980 and 1982 against physicians insured by the St.
Paul Company.43 However, they looked only at claims which had not been
dropped or dismissed prior to incurring at least $1,000 in defense legal
fees. 4 A team of five obstetricians reviewed the company's closed claim files
to determine whether the defendant had negligently inflicted injuries on a
neonate (the so-called "bad baby" cases), rating the care as malpractice, not
malpractice, or unsure.
4 5
Their data showed that the likelihood of receiving a settlement payment
was significantly related to the quality of care rendered to the claimant.
46
Plaintiffs received a settlement payment in 90% of the cases involving
negligent medical care and in 55% of the cases involving proper medical
care.4 7 The high settlement rate in low-odds cases may have been caused by
the authors' decision to exclude from their calculations all claims which had
40. Id. at 799. The coefficient estimate of the log real settlement amount, using good care
as the constant, was .579 (.273) for ambiguous care and 1.34 (.247) for bad care. Id. at 801
tbl.10.
41. Farber & White, supra note 25, at 215 tbl.7. In cases with similar severity, settlements
with bad care were nearly four times larger than settlements in cases with good care. Farber &
White, supra note 38, at 799. Likewise, settlements in cases with ambiguous care were nearly
twice as large as settlements in cases with good care. Id. at 800 (showing that settlements in
ambiguous-care cases were almost 80% larger than good-care cases). In a separate paper, White
reexamined this data and found that, among settled cases, the average recovery in a case rated
as negligent was five times higher than one in which the care was rated as good. Michelle J.
White, The Value of Liability in Medical Malpractice, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1994, at 75, 80 exhibit 2
(finding the difference to be $205,000 in ambiguous-care cases as compared to $41,800 in good-
care cases).
42. This could cause poor-care cases to be misclassified as having good care; then
settlement of these cases would show up as the settlement of a case involving good care.
43. Paul L. Ogburn, Jr. et al., Perinatal Medical Negligence Closed Claims from the St. Paul
Company, 1980-1982, 33J. REPROD. MED. 608, 609-10 (1988). The medical care was rated as
"malpractice," "not malpractice," "or unsure." Id. at 610 fig.1.
44. Id. at 608.
45. Id. at 609. The cases were reviewed a second time by a physician on the research team
"to confirm priorjudgments about medical negligence." Id.
46. Id. (finding a significance level of P<0.001).
47. Id. at 609-10.
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been dropped or dismissed without payment prior to expending $1,000 in
defense legal fees. The authors acknowledged this and warned that their
results "cannot be extrapolated to all closed claims."48 For this reason, their
findings are not included in the bar graphs set out in this Article.
4. Sloan and Hsieh
Frank Sloan and Chee Ruey Hsieh examined all of the 6,612 medical
malpractice claims against Florida obstetrician-gynecologists, general
surgeons, and orthopedic surgeons closed between October 1985 and March
1988.49 The authors hired physicians to rate these cases for likely liability and
50found that the ratings were highly correlated with settlement outcomes.
Those cases in which liability was considered probable were most likely to
result in payment, followed by cases in which liability was unclear, and then
cases with unconvincing evidence of liability.5' Unfortunately, however, the
reviewers based their ratings entirely on a summary of the claim submitted
to the Department of Insurance by the liability insurer. 52 The reliability of
this study, thus, turns largely on the fairness and accuracy of these
53
summaries.
5. Sloan et al.
Sloan and his colleagues then undertook a deeper examination of two
different subsets of Florida malpractice claims.54 The first were claims
48. Ogburn et al., supra note 43, at 609. The researchers also stated that "[t]he majority of
cases judged to be medical negligence were not difficult to evaluate because they included gross
physician neglect and/or mismanagement." Id at 610. This introduces the possibility that the
physician reviewers were using an unduly demanding threshold for a determination of
negligence. However, the reviewers had access to the insurance file that contained the most
complete picture of case quality that is realistically available.
49. Frank A. Sloan & Chee R. Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is The
Compensation Fair?, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 997, 1003-04 (1990). Florida requires insurance
companies to report all closed claims to the Florida Department of Insurance, and the reports
are publicly available. Id. at 1003.
50. Id. at 1010, 1014-17, 1018 tbl.3 (showing a regression coefficient of 0.69, with a
significance level of P=0.01, in a two-tailed t-test).
51. Id. at 1014. These findings led the authors to conclude that "there is a relationship
between the probability of payment and the degree of liability." Id.
52. Id. at 1003.
53. In addition, Sloan & Hsieh aggregated all claims made against separate doctors arising
out of a single incident into a single case and used the information from the defendant, if any,
who paid the highest indemnity. Id. at 1003. This methodology is likely to understate the
number of unfounded claims and to overstate the average settlement paid.
54. FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 17-20 (1993). The study
included some claims which never resulted in a lawsuit. Id. at 25 tbl.2.2. The authors rated a
claim "liable" only if a majority of the four reviewers concluded that at least one of the
defendants had caused the claimant's injuries through negligent treatment. Id. at 99-100. They
rated a claim as "not liable" if a majority felt that none of the defendants had negligently caused
the injuries. Id. The authors deemed all other cases "uncertain." Id. at 100, 107. The uncertain
1792 [2007]
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alleging permanent injuries sustained at birth, and the second were claims
alleging permanent injuries to adults occurring in hospital emergency
departments.1 5 Expert reviewers selected by the authors rated the 187 files as
"liable," "not liable," and "uncertain." 56 A team composed of a neonatologist,
an obstetrician-gynecologist, a general pediatrician, and a family practitioner
who performed obstetrical care rated the birth-injury claims.57 A panel of
four specialists in emergency medicine evaluated the emergency-department
claims.58 These ratings were significantly associated with the likelihood of a
settlement,59 a finding which led the authors to conclude that their results
were inconsistent with the view that the tort system is a "lottery.
60
6. Spurr and Howze
In this 2001 study, Stephen Spurr and Sandra Howze looked at 165
closed claims from a single hospital in Michigan. 61 To measure the quality of
care rendered in these cases, the researchers used the written evaluations of
cases involved either a disagreement among the reviewers or an inability to give a rating due to
the limited availability or quality of the medical records. Id. at 107-08. Each reviewer read and
scored the claims individually. Id. at 98. The physicians evaluated them in three rounds. Id. at
98-99. The first round used only the information submitted to the state on the Florida closed
claim form. Id. The form included the date of occurrence, age and gender of the patient,
description of alleged actions that caused the claim to be filed, the nature of the procedures
performed, and the principal injury giving rise to the claim. Id. In round two, reviewers were
also sent information from interviews with the claimants, along with selected medical
information taken from the medical records. Id. at 99. They were then asked whether they
wished to change their ratings. Id. In round three, when the hospital charts could be supplied
by the hospital (roughly one-third of the cases), the reviewers received abstracts of the hospital
charts prepared by the research team. Id.
55. Id. at 6-8 (indicating the second set was limited to adults between the ages of twenty-
five and fifty-four).
56. Id. at 98.
57. id.
58. Id.
59. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 200, 206. The plaintiffs eventually dropped most of the
no-liability cases. Id. In the cases that received a settlement payment, regardless of rating,
compensation was less than economic losses in nearly 80% of the cases. Id. at 196-97, 197
tbl.9.4. Only one factor suggests any bias in the findings. Surprisingly, in eight of the twenty-
eight cases given a "no liability" rating, the family had been told by a physician or nurse that the
patient's injuries were caused by negligent medical care. Id. at 105. In one case, the defendant
physician had encouraged the family to file a claim against him, stating that "in cases like this,
we have insurance to cover it." Id. at 105, 107, 107 box 6.7. The classification of these claims as
defensible may suggest reviewer bias.
60. Id. at 206.
61. Stephen J. Spurr & Sandra Howze, The Effect of Care Quality on Medical Malpractice
Litigation, 41 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 491, 495 (2001). These claims represented all of the medical
negligence claims brought against the hospital, its staff, and affiliated physicians that were
closed between 1987 and 1995. Id. at 495. Of the 165 closed claim files, 91 were settled, 65 were
abandoned, and 9 were tried to a verdict. Id.
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the hospital risk managers.62 The risk managers often had relied on the
opinions of physicians whom they had asked to evaluate the quality of care
in each case. 6' The researchers found that the hospital's internal assessment
of care quality was correlated strongly with the likelihood of a settlement
payment. Care quality also correlated with the amount of the settlement.
65
As in the Farber and White studies, Spurr and Howze found a strong
correlation between claim quality and disposition despite the use of a rating
process that was probably biased in favor of the defendants. In this study, the
hospital risk managers easily could have been biased in favor of the
physicians with whom they worked. 66
7. Peeples, Harris, and Metzloff
In this 2002 study, Ralph Peeples and his colleagues examined eighty-
67
one malpractice claims filed in North Carolina between 1991 and 1995,
intensively reviewing both the insurer's claims files and the associated court
files.68 To determine whether the plaintiff had been given negligent medical
care, the researchers relied on written reports obtained by the insurance
company from independent medical experts practicing in the same specialty
as the defendant. 69 The researchers found that the medical experts'
62. This information was used to construct a continuous scale from zero (beyond
reproach) to one (conclusive evidence of negligence). Id. at 496. The mean of the fault variable
in the settled cases was 0.54, which was "significantly greater" than the "dropped cases," which
had a mean at 0.11 (P=l.72xl0' 0 ). Id. at 505.
63. Id. at 496. The researchers' translations were based on the risk managers' assessments
of the quality of care, not the claims' likelihoods of success at trial. Id.
64. Id. at 497-99, 499 tbl.2. The likelihood of settlement was not related to the severity of
the patient's injuries. Id. at 499.
65. Settlements were more closely correlated with quality of care than were mediation
awards. Id. at 505-06, 506 tbl.5 (showing a log settlement payment coefficient of 2.63 with a
standard error of 0.57 and significance at the 5% level, and a log mediation award coefficient of
2.07 with a standard error of 0.79 and significance at the 5% level (P=.05)).
66. In addition, the risk managers presumably understood that their in-house evaluation
of care quality could reach the ears of the affected doctors, thus potentially souring
economically crucial hospital-physician relationships.
67. Ralph Peeples, Catherine T. Harris & Thomas Metzloff, The Process of Managing Medical
Malpractice Cases: The Role of Standard of Care, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 877, 877 (2002). The files
were obtained from a major teaching hospital and a major North Carolina malpractice liability
insurer. Id. at 881. The researchers looked only at lawsuits that had progressed to the entry of a
court order directing mediation. Id. Thus, cases that were dropped, dismissed, or settled
immediately after the answer were not included.
68. Id. at 881-82. The insurance files included expert- and physician-review summaries as
well as witness-deposition summaries. Id. at 882. Because the contents of these files are so much
richer than the bare medical record, insurer files are considered the "gold standard" for
conducting medical malpractice research. Id.
69. Id. at 884. The reviewers were also usually from the same state. Id.
[2007]1794
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opinions were directly correlated with the insurers' assessment of liability. V
Among the cases that were closed prior to trial, payment was made in 86.2%
of cases where liability was rated as probable, 36.8% of the cases where
liability was deemed to be uncertain, and 11.1% of the cases rated as
defensible.7
Here, too, the study found correlations despite the use of methods that
could have skewed the ratings in favor of defendants. In the claims
examined in this study, the liability insurer had taken extra precautions to
guarantee that it did not erroneously rate the care of its customers as
probably negligent; the insurer was more likely to seek additional reviewers
if the initial review suggested breach of duty than if that first review
• • 72
exonerated the sued physician. Thus, the insurer designed its methodology
to cure erroneous attributions of negligence but not to cure erroneous
exonerations. This methodology created the risk that the study would
misclassify meritorious cases as lacking merit, thereby overstating the
frequency with which payment had been made in cases with good medical
care.
70. See id. (showing that in 80% of the cases that the insurers assessed as "probably liable,"
the medical experts also found liability likely, and that in 65.4% of the cases that the insurers
assessed as "unlikely liable," the medical experts also found liability unlikely).
71. Id. at 899 tbl.6. When cases that went to trial are added to the total, payment was made
in 93.1% of the cases where liability was rated as probable, 36.8% of the cases where liability was
deemed to be uncertain, and 14.8% of the cases rated as defensible. Id. at 886 n.35, 888-89.
72. Peeples et al., supra note 67, at 884 (finding an average of 3.07 reviews if the insurer
found no breach, 3.27 reviews if the insurer was uncertain, and 4.43 reviews if the insurer found
a breach). Peeples and his colleagues concluded that insurers "proceed more carefully in those
cases in which liability appears likely." Id.
1795
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Table 1. Settlement Percentages in Three-Category Studies
Study Sample Statistical Good Uncertain Poor Methodological
Size Significance Care Car Care Limitations
Taragin 8231 0.001 21% 59% 91% Used reviews
et al. done for insurer
Farber 252 0.001 24% 69% 89% Used reviews
& White done for
1991 hospital
Ogburn 220 0.001 55% 90% Excluded early
et al. Not stated abandonments
Peeples 81 11% 37% 86% Used reviews
et al. Not tested done for
insurers
Farber 355 Constant Coeff. 1.69 Coeff. Used reviews
& White (std. error 2.75 done for
1994 0.245) (std. hospital
error
__________ 0.245) 1________
Sloan & 6612 Constnt 0.11 (,26) 0.69 Reviewers relied
Hsieh (not sig) (,25) on claims
(P=.0 summaries
-1)
Spurr & 165 Coefficient 2.29 Hospital's
Howze ratings
Sloan et 187 Yes
al.
B. TwO-CATEGORY STUDIES
Three other empirical studies used a less-finely grained metric for
measuring claims' quality. The authors of these studies rated the medical
care provided by the defendant simply as negligent or not negligent. A
fourth and very recent study used both a two-category and a multi-category
format to report its data. Three of the four studies found a significant
correlation between the quality of care given to the claimant and the
likelihood of payment-only the Harvard Study did not. Three of the studies
also looked at the size of settlement payments, and each one found that
payment size went up with the strength of the plaintiffs evidence.
Interestingly, the Harvard Study was one of those studies.
1. Cheney et al.
In this 1989 study, Frederick Cheney and his colleagues sought to
determine the impact of the standard of care, as judged by claims filed
against practicing anesthesiologists, on the likelihood and amount of tort
1796 [2007]
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73recovery. They examined 1,004 closed claims files collected from seventeen
insurance organizations throughout the United States.4 Payment occurred
in 82% of the cases involving care judged to be substandard75 and in 42% ofS 76
the cases involving care judged as appropriate. In addition, settlement size
was significantly related to fault.
77
Because this study was sponsored by the American Society of
Anesthesiologists and administered by its Committee on Professional
Liability, it is possible that the anesthesiologists chosen to do the case
reviews were more sympathetic to defendants than the "independent"
physicians employed in some of the other studies.78 However, the design of
this study was superior to most other studies in that the reviewers had access
to the entire lawsuit file.
2. Rosenblatt and Hurst
In this small study, Roger Rosenblatt and Andy Hurst examined thirty-
three obstetrical malpractice lawsuits closed by a single physician-sponsored
insurer between 1982 and 1988. 79 They rated the quality of care given to
each claimant after reviewing the entire claim file, including depositions
taken of the medical experts for both sides.80
They found that none of the claims against doctors who had provided
appropriate care resulted in a settlement payment, while 95% of the
plaintiffs whose claims arose out of negligent care did receive a payment.
81
In every case in which the defendant had paid a settlement, "there was
general consensus among insurance company staff, medical experts.... and
the physician defendants that some lapse in the standard of care contributed
73. Frederick W. Cheney et al., Standard of Care and Anesthesia Liability, 261 JAMA: J. AM.
MED. ASS'N, 1599, 1599 (1989). The goal of the study was to define the impact of the "standard
of care" on the likelihood and amount of financial recovery. Id. The reviewer instructions
defined appropriate care as "that which met the standard of care for a prudent anesthesiologist
practicing anywhere in the US at the time of the event." Id.
74. Id. at 1599-600. In each instance, a single volunteer anesthesiologist reviewed the
lawsuit file and determined whether the care was appropriate or inappropriate. Id. For the 869
cases in which the appropriateness of care could be judged, the reviewer scored care as
appropriate in 46% of cases and inappropriate or below standard in 54% of cases. Id. at 1601.
75. Id. Ten percent received no payment and payment data was missing for 8%. Id.
76. Id. at 1601 (finding a significance level of P< 0.01). Severity of injury did not influence
the likelihood of payment. Id.
77. Id. (finding a significance level of P< 0.05).
78. Cheney et al., supra note 73, at 1599.
79. Roger A. Rosenblatt & Andy Hurst, An Analysis of Closed Obstetric Malpractice Claims, 74
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 710, 710 (1989). The insurer covered the majority of the state's
physicians. Id. It is also worth noting that one of the researchers-Rosenblatt-is a physician. Id.
80. Id. at 711.
81. See id. at 712 tbl.3 (showing that the 95% figure was calculated from data indicating
that nineteen of thirty-three cases involved negligence and eighteen payments were made).
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"82to the observed outcome. The authors wrote that their findings should
"help to reassure physicians who are concerned that the tort process itself is
unjust."
83
Although these findings must be treated cautiously because the sample
of cases was small and tests for statistical significance apparently were not
done, the study's credibility is enhanced by the access that its reviewers had
to the full insurance file, including the depositions of the competing
experts.
3. The Harvard Study (Brennan et al.)
Critics of the medical malpractice system commonly point to the
findings of the Harvard Medical Practice Study in New York hospitals to
support their complaints about settlement fairness. 84 This large study
examined a sample of over 31,000 patient charts taken from fifty-one New
York state hospitals during 1984.85 The study's principal objective was to
learn about the nature and extent of patient injuries caused by medical care.
A small offshoot of the study by Troyen Brennan and his colleagues looked
at the fifty-one medical malpractice claims generated by these 31,000
hospitalizations, forty-six of which had been resolved by 1995. 86 They found
that cases involving medical negligence were more likely to result in a
settlement payment than those cases lacking evidence of negligence, but the
difference was not statistically significant. 87 While five of the nine claims for
injuries caused by negligence resulted in payment, so did ten of the twenty-
four claims deemed to lack causation and six of the thirteen cases deemed
88to lack negligence. They concluded that "the determination of negligence
may be an expensive sideshow." 89 Not surprisingly, their findings and
phraseology have become a standard part of most stump speeches
advocating malpractice reform. 90
In a major critique, Tom Baker has argued that this reliance on the
Harvard Study is misplaced.9 ' His most telling criticism deserves mention
here. He points out that the Harvard data show a strong association between
82. Id. at 712.
83. Id. at 713.
84. See supra note 5.
85. Brennan et al., supra note 2, at 1963-64; A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between
Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence, 325 NEW ENG.J. MED. 245, 245 (1991).
86. Brennan et al., supra note 2, at 1964. The hospital charts for these patients had been
reviewed as part of the larger study by nurses and then by physicians retained by the
researchers. Id. at 1967
87. Id.
88. Id. The presence of a permanent disability was predictive of payment, however. Id.
89. Id. at 1967.
90. See supra notes 1, 5.
91. Baker, supra note 9, at 501-02.
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the amount paid and the strength of the case on liability, even though they
do not show a correlation between claim quality and settlement rates.92
Claims for injuries caused by negligence received a mean settlement of
$162,750, those with causation but not negligence received $31,375, and
those lacking causation received $23,552. 9' As will be explained further in
this Article,94 discounting settlement size to reflect weaknesses in the
plaintiff's case achieves just outcomes that are not revealed in the bare
settlement rate.
The study also suffers from an important shortcoming in its design.
Whenever the two expert reviewers assigned to each file were evenly split on
the propriety of the physician's conduct, the case was classified as a no-
liability case.9 5 Because the divided-opinion cases constituted one-third of
the sample, the decision to classify them as unfounded cases rather than to
create a separate, intermediate category for these toss-up cases was highly
significant. It guaranteed a finding that settlement payments are commonly
made in ostensibly "unfounded" cases. As Michael Saks notes, this
classification system profoundly biased the study toward a finding of
96
systematic error in the civil justice system.
92. Id. at 507-08. Baker also points out that the association that the researchers found
between payment and injury severity "means something other than it first seems." Id. at 508.
This is because the study only assigned disability scores to those injuries that the reviewers felt
had been caused by the patient's medical care. Id. Thus, the study's regression analysis showed
not, as is commonly believed, that every badly disabled patient is likely to get a settlement, but
that a patient who is seriously disabled by her medical care is more likely to receive a payment
than a patient whose care causes only temporary injuries or none at all. In other words, patients
who can prove causation are more likely to get a settlement if their injuries are serious than if
they are minor. Thus construed, the finding accords with both common sense and the
economic realities of malpractice litigation. Larger claims are more likely to be worth the costs
of preparing for trial and will have higher expected values than smaller claims with similar
evidence of negligence.
93. See Brennan et al., supra note 2, at 1966. These are the numbers obtained after the
ratings were revised to reflect information that had surfaced subsequent to the rating process
that occurred ten years earlier. Id. Almost half of the settled cases which had initially been
deemed undeserving by the Harvard team's methodology (a methodology which was
intentionally designed to understate the frequency of credible claims) received less than
$25,000. Id. at 1965. Most of these patients were simply given a write-off of the remaining fees
due to the defendants for the contested medical care. Id.
94. See infra Part II.C.
95. Localio et al., supra note 85, at 249. The category of defensible cases were said to lack
"positive" evidence of negligence. Id. at 250. Disagreements between the two physician reviewers
on this issue were resolved by averaging the two scores and treating as negligent only those
claims in which the average rating was at least "more likely than not." Id. at 246. Thus, any file in
which the two reviewers were evenly split was classified as not caused by negligence. The authors
conceded that their rating process was not like the resolution of a claim at trial. Id. at 249. ("In
a lawsuit, a single expert opinion might be sufficient to support a finding of negligence; under
our protocol it would not."). But they never explored how their calculations would have
changed if the divided-opinion cases were treated as a separate category of claims.
96. See Michael J. Saks, Medical Malpractice: Facing Real Probleu and Finding Real Solutions,
35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 693 (1994) (reviewing a 1993 book by the Harvard team). Of the twenty-
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Finally, this study, like many of the others, was based on a small sample.
As a result, its disparate findings may be due, at least in part, to its
inadequate sample size. Furthermore, because it was only a small part of a
larger study with different objectives, it was not fully designed or powered to
test any hypotheses between claim merits and outcomes. The next study,
however, was so designed, and it, too, was from the Harvard School of Public
Health.
4. Studdert et al.
The most recent study to collect data on the fairness of malpractice
settlements-and probably the best-was published by David Studdert and
his colleagues in 2006.9' This study could have been placed in either the two-
category or multi-category groups, as it used both formats to present its data.
The study analyzed 1,452 claims files randomly selected from the
98
archives of five major malpractice insurers. The study focused on four types
of clinical mishaps--obstetrical, surgical, misdiagnosis, and medication. 99
The researchers retained independent physicians to do the evaluations.100
Physicians in the specialties of obstetrics, surgery, and internal medicine
were hired and trained to review the claim files.'01 A single reviewer read
each file in its entirety and determined whether the claimant's injuries had
been caused by medical error. 10 Because the study used independent
reviewers and gave them access to the entire closed claims file,"°3 its findings
are especially trustworthy. The researchers limited their analysis to the 1,404
one claims that were reviewed for the presence or absence of negligence, eight were considered
by all reviewers to involve breach of duty and seven were considered by one reviewer to involve
negligence. Localio, supra note 85, at 248 tbl.3. Only six claims were considered by both
reviewers to lack evidence of breach of duty. Id. Thus, over two-thirds of the claims reviewed for
breach of duty were determined by at least one of the two reviewers to involve negligent
medical care.
97. David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice
Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2029 (2006) (finding that 40% of all malpractice claims
are not meritorious and that most are resolved without any payment of money).
98. Id. Only 1,441 claims files were evaluated for merit. Id. at 2028.
99. Id. at 2025.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Studdert et al., supra note 97, at 2025. "Reviewers recorded their judgments using a 6-
point confidence scale." Id. at 2026. The study classified the medical care as erroneous if the
claim had received a score of four or above. Id. Only a single reviewer rated each file (though a
small number of files were distributed twice, without the reviewers' knowledge); therefore, this
study design cannot detect cases in which multiple reviewers would have reached divergent
opinions. Id. at 2025. Cases that received a three or a four, both of which were described to
reviewers as "[c]lose call" cases, were not sorted into a middle category of "unclear" cases. Id. at
2028. Errors were defined as "the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended (i.e.,
error of execution) or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (i.e., error of planning)." Id. at
2026 (internal citations omitted).
103. Id. at 2025-26.
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claims in which they could identify a physical or emotional injury' °4 and
reported their findings in both two-tier and multi-tier formats.
Using the two-category format, they calculated a settlement rate of 77%
for the claims involving medical error and 34% for non-error claims.'1 5
When the claims were bifurcated in this way, the mean amount paid to non-
error claimants was significantly lower than the amount paid to claimants
with meritorious claims.
10 6
Researchers also divided the claims into six categories based on the
strength of the plaintiff's case and calculated the odds of a settlement in
each set of claims. To do this, they used a one-to-six scale to measure the
reviewer's level of confidence in a determination of fault, ranging from
"[1]ittle or no evidence" to "[vlirtually certain evidence."'0 7 The authors
found that "[t]he probability of payment increased monotonically" following
either a voluntary settlement or a plaintiffs verdict as the evidence of
negligence became more persuasive. °0 Payments were made in 19% of the
claims with "[l]ittle or no evidence" of error, 32% of the claims with
"[s]light-to-modest evidence," 52% of the claims deemed "[c]lose calls but
<50-50," 61% of the claims rated as a "[c]lose call, but >50-50," 72% of the
claims with "[m]oderate-to-strong evidence," and 84% of the claims with
"[v]irtually certain evidence."'0° Figure 1 depicts these findings graphically.
104. Id. at 2026, 2029 fig.2. For our purposes, it would have been ideal if the study had
reported the settlement rate for all of the claims that did not go to a jury verdict. However, the
authors excluded thirty-seven claims for which they could find no evidence of injury and nine
with only dignitary injury, as well as two for which no rating of care quality was done. Id.
105. Id. at 2028 (P<0.001).
106. Id. (noting $313,205 as the mean amount paid to non-error claimants versus $521,560
as the mean amount awarded to meritorious claimants, PM0.004).
107. Studdert et al., supra note 97, at 2029 fig.2.
108. Id. at 2028. Only 6% of the cases in which payment was made involved plaintiffs
verdicts. Id. at 2030 tbl.2.
109. Id. at 2029 fig.2 (noting that these numbers exclude claims with only dignitary injuries
(nine), those with no injuries (thirty-seven), and those withoutjudgments as to error (two)).
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no modest call, but call, but to strong certain
evidence) evidence) <50-50) >50-50) evidence) evidence)
U Percent of Claimants Paid a Settlement
As a result, the authors concluded that "the malpractice system
performs reasonably well in its function of separating claims without merit
from those with merit and compensating the latter."" n
110. Id. at 2031.
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Figure 1. Studdert et al. Settlement Rate by Confidence in
Determination of Error
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Table 2. Settlement Percentages in Two-Category Studies
Study Sample Statistical
Size Significance























I. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DATA
With the notable exception of the 1991 Harvard Study,"13 every study of
malpractice settlements has found a relationship between settlement rate
and case quality. The relationship is especially easy to see in the studies that
have divided the cases into three categories" 4 rather than two,'' 5 but both
sets of studies confirm the relationship. The relationship is not perfectly
consistent, however: some low-odds cases recover a settlement and some
cases with strong evidence of negligence do not.
The studies also indicate that the plaintiffs who receive a settlement are
unlikely to recover the full amount of their damages.1 6 Instead, the size of
the payment they receive is discounted to reflect the strength or weakness of
their claim.'' 7 Because this discount supplements the discount in settlement
rates, rather than substituting for it, the data strongly suggest that
malpractice claims as a group are discounted in two separate ways-once in
the insurer's decision whether to make any settlement offer at all and again
in the size of the offer to make. The ability of defendants to extract this
111. This number excludes the thirty-seven claims that lacked evidence of causation.
112. This number includes fifty cases that went to a jury verdict, thirty-nine of which were
won by defendants.
113. See supra Part I.B.3.
114. See supra Part I.A.
115. See supra Part I.B.
116. See infra p. 123 tbl.3, p. 131 fig.6.
117. See infta p. 123 tbl.3, p. 131 fig.6.
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double discount suggests that they have substantially stronger bargaining
power than the average claimant.
A. SETILEMENT RATES
The relationship between case quality and settlement rate is most
evident when it is displayed graphically. Figure 2 displays the findings of the
studies that used three categories to rate the quality of care provided to the
plaintiff, e.g., liable, unclear, and not liable.'1 8 Next, Figure 3 depicts the
findings in the studies that used two categories of care quality." 9
Figure 2. Settlement Rates in Three-Category Studies
Cood care I Incertn in Poor r are
1 Cl Peeples et al. DTaragin et al. M Farber & White
118. Although all of the three-category studies found this association, only three reported
their data in form suitable for depiction in this format.
119. In the Rosenblatt and Hurst study, none of the fourteen cases without medical
negligence settled. Rosenblatt & Hurst, supra note 79, at 712 tbl.3. Thus, no bar appears under
"Good Care" in Figure 3, infra p. 123 and Figure 4, infra p. 124.
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I Harvard Study I Cheney et al.
[] Studdert et al. ] Rosenblatt & Hurst
Both graphs show a direct correlation between case quality and
settlement rate. The relationship is less dramatic, however, in the chart for
the two-category studies because these studies lack a category in which to
place the cases with merits that are unclear. This design forces the reviewers
to place all of the cases in which liability is unclear into one of the two
remaining categories. Consequently, the "good care" category in the two-tier
studies contains a larger percentage of cases with a plausible argument for
liability than the "good care" classification in three-category studies. In other
words, the "good care" category includes more cases with legitimate
settlement value in the two-tier studies than it does in the three-tier studies.
Thus, more "good care" cases end up with settlements. The two-category
design also forces the reviewers to place some of the "unclear" cases into the
group of cases rated as "poor care" cases. This increases the odds that cases
in that category will end up being dropped without a settlement payment.
Because this design pushes the settlement rate in "good care" cases up and
the rate in "poor care" cases down, these studies would not be expected to
show as dramatic a correlation between care quality and settlement outcome
as the three-category studies.
Figures 2 and 3 confirm these predictions. The two-category studies of
malpractice settlements tend to find higher settlement rates in weak cases
(about 40%) than are found in the three-category studies (about 20%). The
two-category studies also have lower settlement rates in the strong cases than
are found in the three-category studies, although the difference at this end
1805
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of the scale is less dramatic (56% to 95% for two-category studies versus 86%
to 91% for three-category studies). The predicted relationship is further
illustrated by Figure 4, which places the two sets of findings on a single
graph.









Good-3C Good-2C U ncertain Poor-2C Poor-3C
Quality of Care
* Peeples et al.
E3 Cheney et al.
o Taragin et al. M Farber & White 0 Studdert et al. - 6
E Harvard Study U Rosenblatt & Hurst 99 Studdert et al. - 2
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Figure 4A. Regrouped with Even Spacing and Ascending Order
1807
Good-3T Good-2T Uncertain Poor-2T Poor-3T
Qu ality of Care
When the findings are consolidated in this manner, the correlation
between settlement rate and negligence seems indisputable. It holds up with
startling predictability across a variety of populations and study designs.
Furthermore, the five-category analysis in Figure 4 reveals a strong
association between claim strength and probability of settlement that is
remarkably similar to the strong association that Studdert and his colleagues
found using their six-category analysis as depicted in Figure 1. In each
graph, the likelihood of a settlement payment rises steadily with the strength
of the claimant's case.
Only the findings of the small Harvard Study call this conclusion into
question. Two aspects of the Harvard Study explain its unique findings. The
first explanation lies in the way that the study classified those cases in which
the reviewers disagreed. Whenever the two reviewers were evenly split on the
issue of negligence, the case was classified as a good-care case. That decision
artificially inflated the settlement rate among the good-care cases by placing
all of the toss-up cases in that category.
The second factor distinguishing the Harvard Study is more puzzling. In
the Harvard sample, plaintiffs with strong claims of negligence had much
less success obtaining a settlement than similarly situated claimants in other
studies. As Figure 5 illustrates, it is not an unusually high rate of settlement
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in good-care cases that distinguishes the Harvard Study, but its uniquely low
rate of settlement in poor-care cases.















Good-3T Good-2T Uncertain Poor-2T Poor-3T
Quality of Care
Either the small sample used in that study was very unrepresentative of
litigation outcomes in New York or formidable obstacles stood in the path of
negligently injured New Yorkers during the period of the Harvard Study. As
a result, the troubling finding in the Harvard Study is not that too many low-
odds cases settled, but that too few meritorious cases did.
120
When the findings of the Harvard Study are unpacked in this fashion, it
becomes clear that the Harvard Study is an oddity. Its findings should not
cast doubt on the overwhelming evidence that settlement rates are strongly
correlated with the strength of the plaintiffs case.
Nevertheless, physicians will undoubtedly be dismayed by the fact that
10% to 20% of the cases rated as defensible result in a payment to the
plaintiff. There are, however, three credible reasons why it would be wrong
to assume that the payments rendered in cases rated by the expert reviewers
as defensible were erroneously made. First, researchers have found that a
certain amount of disagreement is inevitable whenever multiple individuals
are asked to rate the quality of another person's past performance.
120. The simultaneous operation of forces driving the settlement rate up in good-care cases
and down in poor-care cases explains why the authors found no statistical correlation between
care quality and the settlement rate.
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Reasonable professionals often reach different conclusions about the same
evidence. In a definitive study of inter-reviewer agreement, Shari Diamond
found that the disagreement rate for scientists engaged in peer review was
25%, the rate for employment interviewers was 30%, for psychiatrists
diagnosing psychiatric illness it was 30%, and for physicians diagnosing
physical illness it was between 23% and 34%. 12 ' Diamond and Zeisel found a
similar rate of disagreement among judges. 2  Researchers who study
physician agreement have found similar discrepancy rates. 123 A material rate
of disagreement is inescapable because it is rarely possible to reconstruct
past events with perfect confidence and because each reviewer will bring her
own perceptions about minimum competence to the task. In medicine, the
potential for disagreement is further compounded by frequent uncertainty
among physicians over the appropriate standard of care and regional
variations in the standard of care.
124
Measured against the expert discrepancy rate of roughly 30%, the 10%
to 20% rate of discrepancy between malpractice settlements and a rating of
good care by expert reviewers actually seems quite good. 12 The same can be
said of the 85% to 90% settlement rate in cases that reviewers rated as
121. Shari S. Diamond, Order in the Court: Consistency in Criminal-Court Decisions, in 2 THE
MASTER LECTURE SERIES: PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAw 119, 125 (C. James Scheirer & Barbara L.
Hammonds eds., 1983).
122. Shari S. Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence Disparity and Its
Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 109, 119 tbl.2 (1975) (finding a roughly 70% rate of agreement in
two different cities among judges on whether an offender should be imprisoned).
123. See, e.g., Farber & White, supra note 25, at 204-05 (finding that in 30% of the cases, the
experts disagreed or gave ambiguous evaluations); A. Russell Localio et al., Identifying Adverse
Events Caused by Medical Care: Degree of Physician Agreement in a Retrospective Chart Review, 125
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 457, 460-61 (1996) (finding a similar disagreement rate on both
negligence and causation); Peeples et al., supra note 67, at 884 (finding that reviewers disagreed
in 34.3% of the cases).
124. See David M. Eddy, Variations in Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty, HEALTH AFF.,
Summer 1984, at 74, 75 (outlining the sources of uncertainty); Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of
the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87 IowA L. REv. 909, 956-58 (2002) (reviewing the evidence).
125. There are two other interesting theoretical explanations for the payment of a
settlement in low-odds cases. One is that these are cases in which a desire for vindication
motivates the plaintiff. These patients may, for example, believe that they were lied to or treated
with disrespect. Studies show that plaintiffs seeking vindication are less likely to drop cases in
which the evidence of negligent treatment is weak. See SLOAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 161. This
persistence may lead to a settlement offer. In addition, prospect theory predicts that low-odds
cases will be settled for a premium. See infra notes 206-14 and accompanying text. This
prediction is based on research finding that individuals facing a low-probability gain (such as a
frivolous lawsuit) tend to be risk-seeking while those facing a high-probability gain tend to be
risk averse. The low settlement rate in low-odds malpractice cases suggests that the predicted
difference in risk tolerances either is not routinely present in malpractice litigation or that it is
usually trumped by other sources of negotiating power that favor defendants. In either event,
the group of low-odds cases that settle may be the set of cases in which the predicted asymmetry
in risk tolerance is most powerful.
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having poor medical care. Here, too, the discrepancy rate is under 20%. It is
probably unrealistic to expect a discrepancy rate much lower than that.
126
The second reason why the 10% to 20% settlement rate in cases rated as
defensible cannot be treated as prima facie evidence of erroneous payments
is that physicians are very reluctant to label the conduct of another physician
as negligent. Doctors expressed a "pronounced reluctance" to label
treatment decisions as negligent even when the care was "clearly
erroneous. " 127 When faced with scenarios that a panel of senior physicians
had previouslyjudged to be clearly negligent, only 30% said that the patients
should receive compensation.12 Thus, the settlement of some cases rated as
defensible may simply constitute the correction of a biased rating.
At the same time, there is troubling evidence that strategic factors
unrelated to the quality of care received by the claimant strongly influenced
some settlement outcomes. In one study, researchers found that defendants
had settled several defensible cases because the insured physician was a bad
witness, a fetal monitor tracing had been lost, or the providers had kept
poor medical records.'29 Similarly, another study found that insurers had
fought settlement in meritorious cases whenever the claimants were deemed
"undesirable." 30 In one case, defense counsel recommended against making
a settlement offer because the plaintiff was "a worthless human being" who
had abandoned his family and given himself an infection using dirty drug
needles.'3 ' In another, the insurer concluded that the jury would
significantly discount damages for an "unemployed drifter" who prompted
the need for medical care by attempting to commit suicide.13 In a third, the
insurer refused to make a settlement offer at the level recommended by
defense counsel because the patient was seriously overweight.
1 33
Only one study has attempted to quantify the impact of strategic factors.
Its examination of the combined impact of the appeal of each party's
witnesses and the reputation of the plaintiffs attorney found that these
strategic factors had a large and statistically significant effect on the
126. Another factor working against a perfect agreement between settlements and the
ratings given by external reviewers is the differences in the factual records on which their
evaluations are based.
127. PAUL WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE 125 (1993) ("We found marked
variation among physicians in their willingness to label certain kinds of medical outcomes as
iatrogenic, and an even more pronounced reluctance to label as negligent those treatment
decisions that, ex post at least, were clearly erroneous.").
128. Id. at 172.
129. Ogburn et al., supra note 43, at 610.
130. See Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the jury's Shadow, 54 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 43,74-75, 83 n.126 (1991).
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• 134
resolution of cases in which liability was uncertain. In fact, settlement
never occurred in an uncertain case when the defendant had an important
strategic advantage.11 The researchers also found some evidence that
strategic factors affect the settlement of cases in which the evidence on
• -e- 136
liability is clearer, but those trends did not have statistical significance.
The role played by strategic factors is troubling. It gives credence to
charges that the system is irrational and unfair. However, the current
evidence suggests that its impact is largely confined to the uncertain cases.
1 3 1
Furthermore, the authors of this study found that the settlement process
"primarily" was driven by evidence of negligence. 138 As in the other studies,
cases with clear liability were most likely to settle, followed by unclear cases,
and then weak cases. The authors also found that settlement in the two sets
of cases in which the evidence of liability was relatively clear was not
significantly affected by the presence of a one-sided strategic advantage.1 39
Given the evidence currently available, it is reasonable to conclude that the
bulk of the discrepancy rate found across the studies in the low-odds and
high-odds cases is the product of normal inter-reviewer variability and,
perhaps, rater bias-not strategic considerations.
The third reason for resisting the conclusion that the settlement of 10%
to 20% of the low-odds cases is unjust is the evidence that most of these
payments are insubstantial. 14  The fairness of a settlement cannot be
134. Catherine T. Harris, Ralph Peeples & Thomas B. Metzloff, Placing "Standard of Care" in
Context: The Impact of Witness Potential and Attorney Reputation in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 3J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 467, 480-82 (2006).
135. Id. at 482.
136. Id. at 479-80 (describing cases with probable liability); id. at 482 (describing cases with
unlikely liability).
137. With the significant exception of attorney experience (which strongly favors
malpractice defendants), we do not yet know whether strategic factors tend to favor one side
more often than the other. See infra notes 237-60 and accompanying text.
138. Harris, Peeples & Metzloff, supra note 134, at 489.
139. Id. at 479-80 (describing cases with probable liability); id. at 482 (describing cases with
unlikely liability).
140. Doctors commonly characterize a settlement payment, no matter how small, as victory
for the plaintiff. See, e.g., Ralph Peeples, Catherine T. Harris & Thomas B. Metzloff, Settlement
Has Many Faces: Physicians, Attorneys, and Medical Malpractice, 41 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAv. 333,
343-44 (2000) (noting the belief that "settlement means guilty" and concluding that
"[slettiement means one thing to physicians and quite another to attorneys"). Thus, physicians
are often dismayed when a weak claim is settled by their insurer, even for a very modest
amount. In their eyes, these settlements belie the claim that liability is premised exclusively on
proof of fault. See id. at 343. Physicians who feel this way implicitly believe that the truth is
binary, i.e., a claim is either warranted or it is not. Just as a traffic light is red, green, or yellow,
but never 40% red, a doctor's treatment either meets the standard of care or it does not.
However, this binary ideal simply does not apply to subjective judgments of fault. See supra notes
116-17 and accompanying text. Reasonable people disagree on judgments of this sort and
there often is no objective benchmark to resolve their disagreement. See id. Even as to factual
determinations, the binary view ignores the limitations in our ability to reconstruct past events.
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evaluated until the amount paid in settlement is ascertained. If the payment
made to a low-odds claimant is substantially discounted, perhaps to a token
or face-saving amount, then the mere existence of a settlement is a poor
barometer of that settlement's fairness. In that event, the 10% to 20%
settlement rate in low-odds cases will greatly overstate the magnitude of any
unfairness. Yet, deep discounting of this sort is comnmon in medical
malpractice litigation.141
B. SETLEMENT SIZE
Only a handful of studies have examined the correlation between
claims quality and settlement size. Of these, all except the Taragin et al.
study have found a positive correlation between the size of a settlement
payment and the strength of the claimant's evidence of negligence.
Table 3. Average Settlement Payments for Differing Levels of Fault
Good Care Uncertain Poor Care
Three-Cate Studies
Farber & White $14,109 $146,16042 $203,209..
1991
Farber & White $7,112 $91,008-" $177,3204.
1994
Taragin et al. Positive correlation, but not significant (P=.16)
Spurr & Howze Positive and significant correlation (P=.05)' '
Two-Category Studies
Cheney P<.05 $93,000 for high-severity $463,000 for high-severity
et al. P<.05 $10,000 for low-severity $15,000 for low-severity
(median) $115,000 for death $200,000 for death




Studdert .004 $313,205 $521,560
et al.
141. See infra Part II.C.
142. Log coefficient of .931 (.466).
143. Log coefficient of 1.54 (.448).
144. Log coefficient of.579 (.273).
145. Log coefficient of 1.34 (.247).
146. Log settlement payment coefficient of 2.63 with a standard error of 0.57.
147. The $23,552 figure covers claims lacking both negligence and causation. The mean
was $31,375 for claims lacking only negligence.
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Good-3C Good-2C Uncertain Poor-2C Poor-3C
0 Harnard Study D Farber& Whote 1994 0 Farber& White 1991 0 Cheneyeta]. (severe)
E Cheneyet al. (minor) 0 Cheneyetal. (death) El Studdert et al.
On the relatively rare occasions when a claimant with a weak claim is
able to elicit a settlement offer, Figure 6 shows that her case is likely to settle
for a much smaller amount than a claimant with similar injuries and a
stronger case on the merits. In the good-care cases, the defendant often
simply forgives unpaid fees for medical care. 148 As would be expected,
claimants with cases of uncertain merit receive more than claimants with
low-odds cases, and plaintiffs with strong cases receive the largest
settlements, though not necessarily the full amount of their injuries.
C. E ou-EDIscouNTING
The data show that the merits of the plaintiffs case affect her
settlement in two distinct ways. First, the strength of the plaintiff's case
affects the likelihood that she will receive a settlement. The weaker her case,
the less likely that she will recover anything. Second, the strength of the
plaintiff's case affects the size of the settlement offer that she will receive,
assuming that she receives any settlement offer at all. The weaker her case,
the smaller the size of the settlement offer she is likely to receive.
Considered separately, each correlation seems fair. Weak claims should fare
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worse, and they do. Yet, the presence of both discounts means that
malpractice claims as a group are doubly discounted. The evidence also
indicates that the sum of these discounts is greater than fairness requires.
During settlement negotiations, lawyers routinely estimate the
settlement value of a case by multiplying the odds of a plaintiff's verdict by
the anticipated recovery in the event of a plaintiff's verdict. In the theory of
negotiation and settlement, this product is called the "settlement value" or
"expected value" of the claim and represents the value that a rational party
would attribute to the claim.149 A fifty-fifty case, therefore, has an expected
value of roughly half of the plaintiff's damages.
The evidence of negligence in a case can range from very weak to very
strong. In some cases, the evidence of negligence may be weak, such that
seven reviewers out of ten would conclude that the defendant satisfied the
standard of care. In much stronger cases, only two out of ten may reach this
conclusion. In this concrete and realistic sense, the "merits" of a tort claim
are based on probabilities. The calculation of a settlement value takes
account of those probabilities. 150
As long as the probabilities used to calculate the settlement value fairly
reflect the underlying merits of the case, the expected value of a claim will
constitute both a rational settlement figure and a fair recovery for the
plaintiff. Because the settlement value of a case is proportional to the
persuasiveness of the evidence of negligence, claims with weak evidence of
negligence should settle for a substantially smaller amount than should cases
with strong evidence of negligence.
Nearly all claims with a nontrivial chance of success and serious injuries
have some settlement value, although that value is often small.15 As long as
settlement payments in those cases roughly correspond with expected value,
a settlement rate approaching 100% for all but the weakest malpractice
claims is fully consistent with a fair settlement process. Thus, it was a mistake
for the Harvard researchers to claim that the civil justice system is an
"expensive sideshow" when their data indicated that the size of the payments
made to plaintiffs was tied directly to the strength of the plaintiffs' cases.
152
Because most serious claims have some settlement value, most should
either settle or go to trial. In malpractice litigation, however, plaintiffs
149. See SLOAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 220 (noting that settlements, unlike trials, will
discount the damages to reflect the probability of success); Spurr & Howze, supra note 61, at
502-04.
150. Spurr & Howze, supra note 61, at 499.
151. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations
and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 342 (1991) (stating that virtually every
case has some probability, however low, that the plaintiff will prevail and every case has some
settlement value). Gross and Syverud note that, under the basic economic model of settlement,
zero-payment offers should be rare, even though they are not. Id. at 343 (reporting that no
settlement offer was made in 25.2% of the personal injury cases in their sample).
152. Brennan et al., supra note 2, at 1963.
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abandon a large fraction of their cases without any payment. 153 The
combined abandonment and dismissal rate in low-odds cases is 80% to 90%,
and in toss-up cases, it is around 40%.1 a It is possible that the high rate of
zero-payment dispositions in low-odds cases occurs because virtually all of
them are so frivolous that they have zero chance of success at trial. However,
that assumption certainly has not been demonstrated. Unless it is true, the
rarity of even nominal settlements strongly suggests that defendants have
superior bargaining power and use it.
The likelihood of asymmetric bargaining power is more strongly
suggested by the high rate of zero-payment dispositions in cases where the
evidence of negligence is ambiguous. Negotiation theory predicts that
essentially all such ambiguous cases will settle for roughly half of the
plaintiffs' actual damages. 15  Yet, roughly 40% of the cases rated as toss-ups
by medical experts are resolved without any payment being made by the
defendant. 56 At the same time, the remaining toss-up cases are settled for
far less than is paid in cases with stronger evidence of liability. Thus,
borderline cases, as a category, are discounted twice-once in the amount
paid to those claimants who do receive a settlement offer and again for the
40% who receive no payment at all. The ability of malpractice defendants to
escape payment altogether in 40% of the toss-up cases suggests an extra
discount beyond that justified by uncertainty of the merits. Defendants'
ability to obtain a double discount in cases in which liability is uncertain
suggests a significant advantage in bargaining power.
It is possible that malpractice defendants are able to extract an
unwarranted discount in cases with strong evidence of medical negligence.
However, this hypothesis cannot be tested directly using the existing studies.
The published data do not reveal the fraction of full damages that is
ultimately paid to most claimants with strong claims. If, however, defendants
are able to extract double discounts in the low-odds and toss-up cases
because of their superior bargaining power, as suggested in Part III, then
that bargaining power is likely to bestow advantages in the settlement of
many high-odds cases as well. The result would be settlements that are, on
average, materially less than full compensation for the claimant's injuries.
15 7
The hypothesis that defendants can extract larger discounts than are
warranted by the evidence of negligence also finds support in studies that
153. Seesupra p. 122 fig. 2.
154. See supra p. 114 tbl. 1.
155. See supra Part II.B.
156. Id.
157. Just as the costs of litigation give defendants an incentive to make nominal payments
to settle weak claims, the costs of litigation similarly provide plaintiffs who have strong evidence
of negligence with an incentive to settle for an amount that is less than their actual damages. See
RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 101 (2002) (noting that litigation
costs lead plaintiffs to set lower settlement expectations).
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have compared the amounts paid in malpractice settlements with the
expected value of the claims. In one such study, Farber and White compared
the amount recommended by state-mandated screening panels with the
amount eventually paid in the actual settlement.158 Based on the historical
practice of the panels, Farber and White reasonably deduced that the panels
were providing the parties with an estimate of the case's expected (or
settlement) value. 5 9 When they compared those estimates to the actual
settlements, they found that settlement amounts fell significantly below
panel recommendations. In cases that did not settle at the amount suggested
by the panel, the average settlement was almost $200,000 below the panel's
recommendation.'6°
A study by Spurr and Simmons also found that disputes that failed to
settle for the amount recommended by the screening panel were usually
settled :or a lesser amount. 6 1 In this study, however, the difference was not
.... 162
large enough for the association to be statistically significant. In a separate
study, Simmons found that the amount recommended by the screening
panels was higher than the eventual settlement or judgment amount in
67.2% of the cases, while falling below the eventual settlement recovery in
163only 17.2%. In addition, the average panel award was $141,341, while the
average recovery was $95,612.'64 He found that defendants rejected the
panel's recommendation 74.5% of the time, while plaintiffs rejected the
recommendation only 49.3% of the time. 65 As a result, Simmons concluded
that "bargaining favors the defendants."
1 66
Overall, the existing research on settlement outcomes strongly suggests
that malpractice defendants usually settle claims against them for less than
the expected value of those claims. This finding indicates that defendants
158. Farber & White, supra note 25, at 207-08.
159. Id. at 208.
160. Id. at 207 (noting that the average settlement was $260,000 while the average
recommendation was $446,000, and stating that only seventeen of the sixty-eight settled cases in
their sample were promptly settled for the figure recommended by the panel). It seems
reasonable to assume that the fifty-one cases rejecting the panel's recommendations would have
settled for even less had a screening panel not reviewed them and made recommendations.
161. Stephen J. Spurr & Walter 0. Simmons, Medical Malpractice in Michigan: An Economic
Analysis, 21J. HEALTH POL. POL'v & L. 315, 337 (1996) (noting that 68.6% of the cases settled
for less than the panel recommended and that the average settlement was $117,063 while the
average recommendation was $125,934).
162. Id. at 337. Only 2.1% had a mediation award of zero. Id. at 336.
163. Walter Orlando Simmons, An Economic Analysis of Mandatory Mediation and the
Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims, J. LEGAL ECON., Fall 1996, at 41, 51 (finding that 15.6%
of the settlements equaled the panel award).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 51 tbl.7.
166. Id. at 52.
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The evidence presented in the studies discussed above strongly
indicates that the odds of a settlement and the likely size of any settlement
are both closely related to the strength of the plaintiff's claim. Payment is
most likely when the quality of care was poor, less likely when it was
uncertain, and least likely when it was good. In addition, settlement amounts
are lowest when the quality of care was good, higher when the quality of care
was too close to call, and highest when the quality of care was poor.
Perhaps these findings should not be a surprise. Insurers, like claimants,
have an economic incentive to evaluate their cases accurately and to shape
their settlement strategies accordingly. Insurers accomplish their objective
by undertaking a form of peer review in which they obtain multiple expert
evaluations and rely on them heavily.' 8 The findings reviewed in this Article
confirm that insurers also have the bargaining power to insist that the
eventual settlements be consistent with those expert assessments of
settlement value. 69 As Peeples and his colleagues have noted, it is ironic that
physicians see the absence of peer review as the major flaw in the current
system of adjudicating malpractice cases.170 Peer review is precisely what the
settlement process currently provides.' 7'
In addition, the data strongly indicate that malpractice defendants have
superior bargaining leverage during the period between the filing of the
claim and its disposition.'7 ' As a result, they are able to extract two kinds of
discounts: one in the settlement rate and another in the settlement
amount.173 In general, this combination of discounts appears to give
defendants more discount than justice requires. The evidence that
malpractice claims as a whole are settled for less than their expected value
supports this hypothesis.
It seems likely that this combination of evidence-driven outcomes and
asymmetric bargaining power yields a settlement pattern something like that
167. See, e.g., Farber & White, supra note 25, at 208; Spurr & Howze, supra note 61, at 495;
Spurr & Simmons, supra note 161, at 340.
168. See Peeples et al., supra note 67, at 884-85, 891-93.
169. See infra Part III.
170. See Peeples et al., supra note 67, at 892 (noting that physicians see the lack of peer
review as a major flaw even though physicians currently determine the standard of care).
171. Id.
172. See supra Part I.C.
173. See supra Part II.C.
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depicted in Figure 7.174 In Figure 7, outcomes are directly related to the
strength of the plaintiff's evidence, but average settlements fall short of
expected value.
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The magnitude of this shortfall from expected value is still unclear. In
addition, it is possible that the discount rate is not uniform across all levels
of case strength. The important point for the purposes of this Article is that
defendants are treated fairly by the settlement process. A secondary lesson is
that the common reliance on settlement rates to measure the fairness of the
existing current settlement is inappropriate; it omits the equally important
aspect of settlement amount-another way in which defendants can insist
that case strength be taken into account. Critiques that look only at
settlement rates will inevitably and substantially overstate the frequency with
which low-odds plaintiffs receive payments that are genuinely unfair. They
will also overlook the extent to which patients who have been injured by
medical negligence receive settlements that are materially smaller than
those patients are due.
When the evidence regarding settlement rates is considered in
conjunction with the evidence that settlements are significantly discounted,
it appears that defendants not only obtain suitable discounts, but they also
174. One could make the same point with a graph showing that average recovery included
not only the cases in which a settlement payment was made, but also all of the zero-payment
cases.
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extract, on average, more of a discount than the merits require. Their ability
to do so suggests that defendants possess a material advantage in bargaining
power.
III. SOURCES OF BARGAINING POWER IN MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
Lobbyists for malpractice insurers and physicians have successfully
cultivated the popular belief that liability insurers are regularly forced to
accede to the outlandish settlement demands of plaintiffs with dubious
claims in order to avoid the "lottery" of ajury trial. The data suggest, instead,
that malpractice insurers negotiate from a position of power and that they
employ their power in a hard-nosed, business-like manner.
What explains this discrepancy in negotiating power? The most likely
sources of the defendants' advantage lie in asymmetric stakes that give
defendants an incentive to fight low-odds claims fiercely, asymmetric risk
tolerance that prompts plaintiffs to settle at a discount, shared knowledge
that plaintiffs actually win very few jury trials, shared knowledge that cases
resulting in plaintiffs verdicts routinely are settled for significantly less than
the jury award, and the defendant's superior access to useful resources of
several kinds. Together, these factors appear to push the amounts actually
paid in settlement below the expected fair value of the claims based on their
underlying merits.
A. ASYMMETRIC STAKES AND HARD BARGAINING
In malpractice litigation, doctors and the insurers who defend them are
widely believed to have more at stake than the patients who sue them. While
both parties stand to win or lose the monetary amount of a settlement or
judgment, the doctor also risks her reputation, lost work time, emotional
strain, and self-esteem. The insurer risks its reputation as a hard bargainer.
For doctors, the most obvious additional stake in malpractice litigation
is their interest in preserving their reputations.1 15 Equally important, but
much less appreciated, is the impact that resolution of a malpractice claim
has on a physician's self-esteem. v6 Many physicians believe that a settlement
payment constitutes an admission of fault. 77 Seeking public vindication, 78
they resist the settlement of claims in which the evidence of negligence is
175. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 26 (1984) (explaining that "the relative [settlement] calculus ... changes" when one
party has more to lose from an adverse verdict); Spurr & Simmons, supra note 161, at 338.
176. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 151, at 365-66 (suggesting that self-esteem is
implicated more than reputation by the settlement decision).
177. See Peeples, Harris & Metzloff, supra note 140, at 343-44.
178. Id. at 342 (indicating that almost two-thirds of physicians who thought they were not
liable expressed a desire for vindication).
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weak, even if the case could be settled for a nominal amount.'79 Their
obligation to report settlements in any amount to the National Practitioner
Data Bank ("NPDB") further reinforces their incentive to resist the
settlement of low-odds cases. 
s
8
Physician aversion to the settlement of low-odds cases is especially likely
to affect settlement outcomes when the physician's insurance policy has a
contractual provision giving the insured physician the power of approval
over all settlements. In one report, 17% of settlements recommended by
the defense counsel were vetoed by physician-defendants possessing
approval authority.1s 2 In one set of cases in which no offer was ever
communicated to the plaintiff, physicians had reportedly vetoed offers in
39.1% of the cases. 8 3 In addition, a California study estimated that there
would be 14% fewer trials in the absence of a "physician consent"
provision. 4 Although these clauses have become less common, these data
nevertheless illustrate the importance that physicians place on fighting
frivolous claims.
A liability insurer also has a powerful incentive to insist on favorable
settlement terms. As a repeat player, the insurer values its reputation as a
hard bargainer.'l s It will be especially reluctant to settle "nuisance" cases
even when they can be settled at or below their expected value. Hard
bargaining in low-odds cases will also appeal to their customers, as many
physicians view settlement as an admission of guilt.
Although the insurer's incentive to strike hard bargains is not confined
to low-odds cases, it is easiest to document in this class of cases because
defendants often make no settlement offer at all. For example, Thomas
179. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 151, at 366. For the same reason, plaintiffs who are
strongly motivated by nonpecuniary objectives are less likely to drop their cases. See Frank A.
Sloan & Thomas J. Hoerger, Uncertainty, Information and Resolution of Medical Malpractice Disputes,
4J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 402, 415 (1991).
180. See Teresa M. Waters et al., Impact of the National Practitioner Data Bank on Resolution of
Malpractice Claims, 40 INQUIRY 283, 283 (2003) (finding that physicians have been less likely to
settle claims since introduction of the NPDB in 1990, especially for payments less than $50,000).
181. See, e.g., Brion v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 651 S.W.2d 183, 184 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (calling
this a "pride" provision); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REv. 1113, 1176 (1990)
(stating that contracts with these clauses are 1% to 3% more expensive).
182. Gross & Syverud, supra note 151, at 361 n.103.
183. See id. (discussing "zero-offer cases in which a physician was the sole defendant at trial
(9/23)-).
184. Syverud, supra note 181, at 1178-79.
185. "Hard bargaining" is predicted by negotiation theory when a repeat player, like the
liability insurer, faces non-repeat litigants. See Priest & Klein, supra note 175, at 24-29
(discussing the "likelihood of litigation" when parties have "[a]symmetric [s]takes"); see also
Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11J.
LEGAL STUD. 225, 241-42 (1982) ("[Olur model predicts that a repeat player whose opponents
are not repeat players will adopt a hard bargaining strategy."). For a discussion of the doctor's
stakes, see Spurr & Simmons, supra note 161, at 338 (noting "the costs of trial to a defendant
physician in terms of lost time, emotional strain, and the damaging publicity").
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Metzloff found that no settlement offer of any kind had been made by the
insurer in nearly 60% of the cases that went to trial. 186 Plaintiffs prevailed in
only three of these trials. 18' He also found many comments in the claims files
mentioning the insurance company's desire to cultivate a reputation for
rejecting "nuisance value" settlements.188 The insurer had declined to make
a settlement offer in 80% of the cases rated as defensible and in 85% of the
toss-up cases. By contrast, it had only declined to make an offer in 9% of
the cases it expected to lose. 90
The most dramatic evidence that defendants resist settlement in low-
odds cases comes from the study done by Peeples, Harris, and Metzloff.19' In
the cases they examined, defendants made offers in 96.3% of the claims in
which the evidence of liability was strong (twenty-six of twenty-seven), only
35.3% of the toss-up claims (six of seventeen), and 4.5% of the cases
believed to be defensible (one of twenty-two).,92
In their study of California trials, Gross and Syverud found that
malpractice defendants were far less likely to have made a settlement offer
prior to trial than defendants in other personal injury actions. 193 In their
sample, the malpractice defendants had made no settlement offer to the
plaintiff in 60% of the trials, 9 4 far exceeding the 25.2% rate for other
personal injury trials. 9
5
Sloan and Hsieh concluded that malpractice defendants and their
insurers tend to fight the defensible cases vigorously in order to preserve
their reputations and to avoid setting a bad precedent. 96 Harris and her
colleagues reached the same conclusion,' 97finding that insurers rarely made
an offer before the plaintiff had identified a favorable expert witness.
98
186. Metzloff, supra note 130, at 77 n.111. No settlement offer was made in twenty-eight of
forty-eight cases, or 58.3%. Id. Metzloff also found that settlement offers had been made prior
to trial in over 90% of the likely successful claims (ten of eleven). Id.
187. Id.at77n.111.
188. Id. at 78.
189. Id. at 77 n.111. No offer was made in sixteen of twenty anticipated unsuccessful claims,
eleven of thirteen toss-ups, and one of eleven successful claims. Id.
190. Id.
191. Peeples et al., supra note 67, at 887.
192. Id. at 899.
193. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 151, at 378.
194. Id. at 346 tbl.3.
195. Id. at 343.
196. See Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 49, at 1018. This hard bargaining, including the
frequent failure to make any offer at all, may partially explain why malpractice trials are twice as
likely to occur than trials of other personal injury claims. Plaintiffs are left with a choice
between dropping the case and proceeding to trial. This posture may also explain the high
fraction of zero-dollar dispositions in medical malpractice cases.
197. Peeples et al., supra note 67, at 887 (noting that insurers resist the settlement of cases
in which the standard of care was not breached).
198. Id.
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Finally, a 2003 study found that defendants became less willing to settle weak
claims after the creation of the National Practitioner Data Bank.'go
However, the factors that give malpractice defendants incentive to drive
a hard bargain in cases with weak evidence of negligence-such as
protection of reputation and self-esteem-could make them eager to settle
cases with strong evidence of negligence. According to negotiation theory, a
party with more to lose from an adverse verdict has less bargaining power
200under those circumstances. If physicians have more to risk from an
anticipated loss, they have strong incentive to settle the cases that they are
most likely to lose, 20' even if they must pay a premium over expected value to
do so.
The studies appear to confirm the hypothesis that malpractice
defendants try more vigorously to settle the strong claims than to settle the
weak ones. One .study found that cases were consistently settled when the
evidence of negligence was strong (86.2%) but rarely settled when the
evidence was weak (11.1%).22 Another found that when the plaintiff's claim
appeared to be strong, the defendant was most likely to agree to the figure
203recommended by a screening panel.
The studies do not reveal whether the defendant's incentive to settle
results in the payment of a premium, however. The studies do not provide
data with which to compare the expected value of these claims with their
actual outcomes. If a premium is paid, then the pattern of predicted
settlements would look more like Figure 8 than Figure 7204
199. Waters et al., supra note 180, at 290 (finding that settlements in low-odds cases had
dropped about 30% and also finding that the settlement rate in high-probability cases had
declined, though the change was not statistically significant).
200. See Priest & Klein, supra note 175, at 40.
201. See id.
202. Peeples et al., supra note 67, at 886. Of the twenty-two low-odds cases in which the
defendant made no settlement offer, half were dropped without payment and ten of the
remaining cases resulted in defense verdicts. Id. at 888.
203. Simmons, supra note 163, at 42.
204. The amount paid to settle all malpractice claims falls short of their total expected
value. Thus, Figure 8 shows heavier discounting in the low-odds and toss-up cases than Figure 7.
See supra Part II.B. If the discount implicit in this finding is not present in the cases with strong
evidence of liability, then it presumably is concentrated in the toss-up and low-odds claims. The
extra discounting of low-odds claims is also consistent with the evidence showing that insurers
resist settlement in these cases.
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It is possible, however, that settling high-odds cases does not require a
premium. This may be true because the advantage, if any, conferred on
claimants by the inequality of stakes easily could be offset by other
negotiating advantages that favor defendants, such as greater risk tolerance
and superior resources. In addition, some scholars are unconvinced that the
extra-judicial motivation of malpractice defendants is very powerful. Thomas
Metzloff, for example, reviewed insurance-company litigation files and
found no evidence that doctors were trying to influence the settlement
decisions.0 5 If the extra-judicial costs that would be imposed on sued
physicians by the trial process or by an adverse verdict do not play a large
role in the settlement decision of malpractice insurers, then it is very
unlikely that the insurers are paying a premium to settle cases. As will be
discussed in the rest of this Part, too many other factors favor the insurers.
As a consequence, the role that asymmetric stakes play in the settlement
of high-probability cases remains uncertain. However, the incentive that
asymmetric stakes give malpractice defendants to resist the settlement of
low-odds cases helps explain why 80% to 90% of the low-odds cases are
resolved without even a nominal payment, contrary to the predictions of
205. Metzloff, supra note 130, at 78.
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negotiation theory, and the remaining low-odds cases are settled at a deep
discount.
B. ASYMMETRIC RISK TOLERANCE
In personal injury litigation, plaintiffs generally are believed to be more
206risk averse than the liability insurers with whom they are negotiating. Risk
aversion is the tendency of people who face a choice between a certain gain
207and less-certain larger gain to prefer the certain gain. Insurers are
believed to be less vulnerable to this tendency because they are "repeat
players" who can average out their wins and losses over a series of cases
unlike a one-shot plaintiff.208 On the other hand, personal injury plaintiffs
who have only one chance at recovery and who receive a relatively low
settlement offer are likely to find it difficult to refuse that offer (a certain
gain) in the hopes of obtaining a larger verdict at trial.2 09 This tendency
should allow defendants to settle cases at a discount.
Several researchers have concluded that the empirical data support this
theoretical prediction. After analyzing several possible explanations for the
low sums received by malpractice plaintiffs, Farber and White attributied
these outcomes to greater risk aversion among plaintiffs.210 Spurr and
206. See, e.g., id. at 62-63; Priest & Klein, supra note 175, at 27. A risk-neutral plaintiff would
be indifferent to the choice between accepting a $100,000 settlement offer and proceeding to
trial in a case with a 50% chance of winning a verdict of $200,000 because each choice has the
same expected value. By contrast, a risk-averse plaintiff would prefer the settlement as it
substitutes a sure gain for a risky one. She will do so even though the "expected values" are the
same and a trial would offer the possibility of an even larger gain (something that would appeal
to a risk-seeking individual). See Metzloff, supra note 130, at 62-63.
207. See Farber & White, supra note 25, at 208; Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A
Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 163, 167 (2000); Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 49, at 998.
208. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REv. 95, 99-100, 110 (1974) (noting that personal injury insurers typically
are repeat players and that repeat players are more likely to be risk neutral, i.e., indifferent to
uncertainty); KOROBKIN, supra note 157, at 46 (illustrating why repeat players are risk neutral).
209. In theory, this negotiating advantage should not extend to the weakest malpractice
claims because social scientists have found that the tendencies to accept a settlement are
reversed when the probability of gain is very small. See Guthrie, supra note 207, at 168-69. See
generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory:
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 51 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992). That may explain
why 10-20% of the low-odds cases result in some settlement. See supra p. 124 fig.4, p. 125 fig.4A.
In most low-odds cases, however, the plaintiffs advantage apparently is outweighed by other
factors that confer a negotiating advantage on defendants.
210. Farber & White, supra note 25, at 208. The authors ruled out lower trial costs and
higher defendant optimism as explanations of this bargaining power. Id. at 208. For a
description of how risk aversion affects litigants' decisions, see W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability
Litigation with Risk Aversion, 17J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 103 (1988) (concluding that claimants' risk
aversion is greater than defendants' risk aversion). Patients who hold out until later in the
negotiation process appear to get higher payments, thus rewarding their risk taking. Sloan &
Hsieh, supra note 49, at 1026.
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Simmons reached the same conclusion. 21l The presence of asymmetric risk
aversion is also consistent with the finding of Peeples and his colleagues that
cases settle whenever the defendant makes an offer-any offer. They found
that 94.4% of the cases in which the insurer made an offer were
settled. 2 Unequal risk tolerance is also suggested by the studies finding that
defendants are more likely than plaintiffs to reject the recommendations of
pretrial screening panels. Simmons found that defendants rejected the
panel's recommendation in 74.5% of the cases, while plaintiffs rejected
recommendations in 49% of the cases. 2 3 Farber and White also found that
defendants were far more likely than plaintiffs to reject the amounts
recommended by state screening panels.2t 4 Thus, it seems reasonable to
conclude that plaintiff risk aversion explains some of the negotiating
advantage possessed by malpractice defendants.
C. ANTICIPATED JuRY SKEPHCISM
Trial lawyers have long known that malpractice claims are hard to win.
The jury-verdict studies support them. Contrary to popular belief, juries tend
to resolve close cases in favor of defendants. 215 The studies show that
defendants win most of the cases that external reviewers classify as toss-up
cases and half of the cases that the reviewers believe defendants should
lose.2 ' Thus, juries render verdicts for plaintiffs much less frequently than
predicted by external reviewers. These findings show that juries are skeptical
of patients who sue their doctors and, as a result, insist on more substantial
proof than physician reviewers do. The teeth they give to the burden of
proof essentially converts it into a "clear and convincing evidence" standard
and gives defendants a substantial bargaining advantage during settlement
negotiations.
Perhaps this should not be surprising. Many Americans are deeply
concerned about excessive litigation and high liability-insurance
premiums. 217 In one study, four of five potential jurors agreed that "[p]eople
211. See Spurr & Simmons, supra note 161, at 340 (attributing the difference between
expected value and settlement amount to either plaintiffs' risk aversion or "their disadvantage
in bargaining").
212. Peeples et al., supra note 67, at 887.
213. Simmons, supra note 163, at 48. Simmons also found that 15.6% of the settlements
equaled the panel award. Id. at 51.
214. Farber & White, supra note 25, at 208.
215. See generally, Philip G. Peters, Jr., Doctors and Juries, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1453 (2007)
(comprehensively reviewing the empirical literature that tests the correlation between jury
verdicts and evidence of negligence).
216. Id.
217. See David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders and Personal Injuries in an
American Community, 18 LAW & Soc'" REV. 551, 553, 559-61 (1984) (finding that citizens in a
rural Illinois cotnty disapproved of "cashing in" via personal injury lawsuits and characterized
those who did sue as "people looking for the easy buck"); Edith Greene et al., Jurors' Attitudes
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are too quick to sue" and that "[tjhere are far too many frivolous lawsuits




This mood of public skepticism extends to lawsuits against physicians.
In his study of potential jurors, Neil Vidmar found that members of the jury
pool often made remarks during voir dire that revealed their skepticism
220about malpractice litigation. Many made comments like "too many people
sue their doctors" and "[malpractice suits are] just going to raise the health
insurance rates for the rest of us." 22' In another study of potential jurors,
one-third of the respondents believed that medical malpractice plaintiffs are
222looking for easy money. Respondents were even more skeptical of
plaintiffs' lawyers. Two-thirds felt that these lawyers pressured clients into
223tsuing their doctors. Many felt that medical malpractice litigation is ruining
the health-care system.
2 24
These underling attitudes toward tort litigation were first explored in
David Engel's landmark summary of two years of fieldwork studying
community attitudes toward personal injury litigation in a small,
predominantly rural Illinois county he called "Sander County." 225 Although
personal injury litigation rates were low, residents of Sander County strongly
disapproved of personal injury lawsuits. Those surveyed characterized
claimants as "greedy," "quick to sue," and "looking for the easy buck."226 He
observed that "[t]he negotiating process was, of course, strongly influenced
About Civil Litigation and the Size of Damage Awards, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 805, 814 (1991) (finding
that 91% ofjurors studied thought "there were too many lawsuits"); Valerie Q. Hans & William
S. Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation
Explosion Debate, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 85, 94 (1992) (stating that "tort injuries approached their
own cases with considerable suspicion about the plaintiff-).
218. Hans & Lofquist, supra note 217, at 93. This study asked potential jurors about tort
cases against corporations. Id.
219. Id. Some of the skepticism about plaintiffs may be the product of cognitive
dissonance-we do not want to think poorly of the people to whom we entrust our lives and
well-being. Another possible explanation has been suggested by medical sociologists who
believe that the poor success of malpractice plaintiffs in court is a predictable consequence of
their lower social status relative to physicians. See Jeffrey Mullis, Medical Malpractice, Social
Structure, and Social Control, 10 Soc. F. 135, 137, 145, 149 (1995) (arguing that wealth and social
status help defendants in medical malpractice cases).
220. NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE
MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 169
(1995).
221. Id.
222. Ellen L. Leggett, Identifying Juror Bias and Their Impact on Malpractice Cases (Sept.
7, 1999) (unpublished article, on file with the Iowa Law Review).
223. Id.; see Greene et al., supra note 217, at 817 (finding that most jurors believe attorneys
encourage people to file frivolous lawsuits).
224. See Leggett, supra note 222 (discussing her findings).
225. Engel, supra note 217, at 553, 559-61.
226. Id. at 553.
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by the parties' shared knowledge of likely juror reaction if the case actually
went to trial. Thus, plaintiffs found negotiated settlements relatively
attractive even when the terms were not particularly favorable."227
Observers have also noted more recent signs that the public has lost
patience with tort litigation. In Texas, lawyers report that the "going rate"
for settlement of tort claims has gone down.2 s In Wisconsin, defendants are
now requesting jury trials in soft tissue cases. 229 These signs indicate that the
bargaining power of defendants has been strengthened by public concern
over excessive tort litigation.
This bargaining advantage is further amplified by the success that losing
malpractice defendants have had in negotiating post-trial settlements for
substantially less than the damages awarded by the jury. Faced with the
prospect of an appeal, an underinsured defendant, a damage cap, or
possibly all three, winning plaintiffs typically settle their cases for somewhere
between 44% and 71% of their jury award.230 The larger the verdict, the
231more likely a reduction in recovery will occur. In cases with verdicts larger
than $22.5 million, a recent study determined that 98% of the plaintiffs
232settled for less than their jury award. The average reduction was 56% and
the median reduction was 61%. 233 Insurance-policy limits were the most
important explanation for these settlements. 214 As a result, nearly every
plaintiff with an extremely large award actually received less than half of that
award in settlement.
2 35
Of course, most cases settle prior to trial. But they do so in the shadow
236
of their anticipated outcomes. It turns out that the ultimate payments are
far lower than the sums awarded by juries as full compensation. This routine
discounting of proven claims, which results from factors unrelated to
liability, presumably has the effect of reducing the pretrial settlement value
227. Id. at 564-65.
228. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times: The
Precarious Nature of Plaintiffs' Practice in Texas, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1781, 1783, 1796 (2002); see also
Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY L.J. 1225 passim
(2004) (arguing that the tort-reform debates have succeeded in changing the environment in
which civil litigation occurs).
229. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REwARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 300 n.33 (2004) (reporting on anecdotal statements by
counsel).
230. David A. Hyman et al., Do Defendants Pay WhatJuries Award? Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas
Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988-2003, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript
at 2, on file with the Iowa Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=914415 (finding





235. Hyman et al., supra note 230, at 2.
236. Id.
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of malpractice claims below the amount that would otherwise be justified by
the merits of the claim. Therefore, it seems likely that this combination of
skeptical juries and discounted verdicts explains a material portion of the
bargaining advantage enjoyed by malpractice defendants.
D. SuPERIoR RESOURCyS
Malpractice defendants have superior access to several resources that
are important in litigation. Malpractice defendants have several advantages
than can be translated into favorable settlements, such as their personal
knowledge of the events that took place and their representation by more
experienced attorneys.
1. Access to Information
The health-care providers who take care of the patient ordinarily know
more than the patient about the circumstances of her treatment, which gives
237them a negotiating advantage. Malpractice defendants make use of this
advantage, often resisting settlement despite knowledge that the patient's
injuries were caused by medical negligence One study observed that a
hospital rarely made a settlement offer when patients used its voluntary,
239informal complaint process. Instead, it used the process "to learn about
the litigiousness of specific patients," and it used "the filing of lawsuits as a
hurdle that patients must overcome in order to convince the hospital that
they are sufficiently litigious to justify a high settlement."240 In other words,
peaceful patients were rarely compensated-not even when the hospital
241believed that medical negligence was the cause of the patient's injury.
Another study found that parties involved in cases with severe injuries
generally did not settle prior to a patient's filing of a lawsuit.242 Often the
defendant would make no offer until the patient had not only filed suit, but
had also retained an expert who would testify that the defendant breached
243the standard of care. This was true even when the defendant's expert
consultants concluded that the defendant had violated the applicable
237. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J.
ECON. 404, 409 (1984).
238. Id.
239. Farber & White, supra note 38, at 788 (noting that thirty-seven of 355 claims were
settled without a lawsuit when initiated by a complaint process).
240. Id. ("[T]hese empirical results are consistent with an information structure in which
patients initially are poorly informed about the quality of medical care and the hospital initially
is poorly informed about how litigious patients are.").
241. Id. at 795. At most, a hospital makes small settlement offers. Id. at 802. The goal is to
avoid settling with the "peaceful" patients who will not file suit. Id. at 795.
242. Rosenblatt & Hurst, supra note 79, at 711 (noting that pre-suit settlement rarely
occurred in cases of neonatal death).
243. See Peeples et al., supra note 67, at 886 (finding insurers almost always deposed experts
for the plaintiff).
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standard of care. Had these plaintiffs known what the hospital knew, their
outcomes might have been very different.
2. Financial Resources
It seems reasonable to assume that liability-insurance companies will
typically have superior financial resources, especially when a non-specialist
attorney represents the claimant. These resources can be converted into
244
superior bargaining power. Money can be used to buy the services of more
talented and more experienced attorneys. It can be used to overwhelm the
adversary with discovery requests or to hire more and better expert
witnesses.245 Resources can also insulate a party from the costs and financial
exigencies caused by delay, giving that party a bargaining advantage over
parties for whom delayed resolution is more painful, such as an injured and
unemployed plaintiff.246 A plaintiff who cannot pay her medical bills or her
rent until she receives her settlement has much less bargaining power than
an insured defendant. It is quite possible that the need for prompt
compensation provides a more powerful explanation of the high settlement
rate in cases with strong evidence of negligence than does the defendant's
extra-judicial stakes.
3. Experts
Malpractice defendants are widely and quite reasonably believed to
have less difficulty convincing well-respected practicing physicians to testify
on their behalf.247 This advantage allows defense counsel to be more
selective. In addition, defendants use their superior resources to call more
248expert witnesses at trial. Presumably, the mismatch is even more
pronounced on the issues of liability and causation because the burden of
proving damages prompts plaintiffs to call expert witnesses on that issue far
more than defendants do.249
4. Lawyer Experience
Malpractice-defense attorneys as a group are substantially more
experienced in medical malpractice litigation than plaintiffs' attorneys.50
244. KOROBKIN, supra note 157, at 153.
245. See id. at 156 (noting that it is not always cost-effective to hire more expert witnesses).
246. Id. at 171-72.
247. I have observed this belief throughout my many years serving as defense counsel in
malpractice suits.
248. Neil Vidmar, Are Juries Competent to Decide Liability in Tort Cases Involving
Scientific/Medical Issues? Some Data from Medical Malpractice, 43 EMORY L.J. 885,902 (1994).
249. See SLOAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 92-93.
250. See, e.g., id. at 208, 216 (finding that specialists constitute a minority of plaintiffs'
attorneys and recommending specialty certification); Galanter, supra note 208, at 110 (noting
that, in general, personal injury insurers are typically repeat players, while personal injury
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The studies strongly suggest that the difference in experience greatly affects
outcomes. Most lawyers hired by malpractice insurers are experienced
specialists who have represented them in the past.25' By contrast, less than
one quarter of the plaintiffs have lawyers with substantial malpractice
252
experience. One study found that a seasoned defense lawyer was four
times as likely to be matched against an inexperienced plaintiff's attorney as
an experienced plaintiffs attorney was to be matched against inexperienced
defense counsel.253
Research shows that the extra experience matters. In one study,
plaintiffs' attorneys who specialized in malpractice litigation negotiated
settlements that were roughly twice as large as the amounts obtained by non-
. • •254
specialists in similar cases. The study found that non-specialists were more
likely to accept a token settlement.255 Their cases were far more likely to
settle for a fraction of the economic loss.25 6 The authors viewed this finding
251
as a reason to favor the certification of malpractice specialists. Similarly, a
North Carolina study concluded that "the skills of plaintiffs' attorneys in
estimating the value of malpractice cases are in the aggregate less well
refined than insurers' and defense counsels' skills."258 Defendants also have
plaintiffs are not); Catherine T. Harris, Ralph Peeples & Thomas B. Metzloff, Who Are Those
Guys? An Empirical Examination of Medical Malpractice Plaintiffs'Attorneys, 58 SMU L. REV. 225, 241
(2005) (reporting that defense counsel in the study sample had handled an average of over
twice as many malpractice cases as had their counterparts); Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 49, at
997-98 (reviewing the literature relating to variability in medical malpractice payments).
251. See Galanter, supra note 208, at 97-98 (noting that repeat players will have greater
expertise and better access to specialists).
252. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 76. The definition of "specialist" was based on a
combination of factors and. included the attorneys in firms that handled four or more
malpractice cases during the period of the study and those listed on several specialty lists. Id. at
170 (noting that specialists represented 23% of the claimants).
253. Harris et al., supra note 250, at 243. Unfortunately, however, this study did not
measure case quality and, thus, could not rule out the chance that the superior outcomes of
experienced counsel were the product of a better case mix.
254. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 216 (holding liability and severity constant). "Holding
other factors constant," specialists got payments that were 92% higher. Id. at 201. Interestingly,
this was not because specialists were able to obtain settlements in excess of the case's expected
value or even in excess of the patient's economic losses. The settlements were too small on
average to cover even economic loss. Id.
255. Id. at 208.
256. Id. at 216. The cases in which no payment or very low payment resulted constituted
51% of the cases handled by nonspecialists and 29% of the cases handled by specialists. Id. at
197 tbl.9.4.
257. Id. at 208.
258. Metzloff, supra note 130, at 80. He observed that plaintiffs' attorneys more often made
outlandish demands. Id. at 75-76. Similarly, Russell Korobkin notes that an inexperienced
attorney may be more likely to mistake his aspiration price for his reservation price, thereby
leaving a decent settlement on the table. KOROBKIN, supra note 157, at 62-63. As to why this
discrepancy in skill should be more powerful in medical malpractice cases than in other
1830 [2007]
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acknowledged the relevance of experience; they spend considerably more
money on trial preparations when they are defending against specialists than
against non-specialists.
259
Of course, plaintiffs will sometimes have a superior lawyer or an
extraordinary expert. Perhaps this explains why some low-odds claims end
up being settled rather than dropped.260 However, defendants seem to have
the advantage of these mismatches more often than plaintiffs. This
advantage could help explain how defendants are able to extract a double
discount of the low-odds and toss-up claims.
E. SYNTHESIS
The most likely sources of a malpractice defendant's superior
bargaining power are the incentives that repeat players have to fight low-
odds claims vigorously; their superior risk tolerance; the mutual knowledge
that plaintiffs usually lose at trial; and the defendant's superior access to a
variety of trial resources, including information about the events in dispute,
experienced representatives, and expert witnesses. However, defendants may
lose some of their advantage in cases with strong evidence of negligence.
Further study is needed to determine whether they pay a premium to settle
this group of cases.
These are the systematic biases. The more recent studies of malpractice
settlements have also suggested that settlement outcomes are materially
influenced by strategic considerations that are not systematically distributed
and thus cannot be detected from the aggregate data. The role played by
these strategic factors is as troubling as the role played by the systematic
biases already discussed. They, too, will lead critics to conclude that the
system is irrational and unfair. At present, however, we know very little about
the number of settlements that are materially changed by these strategic
factors or whether they are distributed unevenly between the parties.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the findings of the notorious Harvard Study, medical
malpractice settlements are neither random nor irrational. Both the
likelihood of a settlement payment and the amount paid in settlement are
closely related to the merit of the underlying claim of medical negligence.
Both are the products of an insurance-claims process that acts much like
peer review. Payment is most likely when the quality of care was poor, less
personal injury cases, Metzloff suggests that malpractice cases accentuate the need to locate
experts and to understand a unique body of substantive issues. Metzloff, supra note 130, at 80.
259. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 216. Specialists were no more or less likely to have a
liable defendant but were slightly more likely to have an "uncertain" case. Id. at 185 app.8A.
Their cases did, however, involve more severe injuries as measured by economic loss. Id. at 170.
260. See Peeples et al., supra note 67, at 895 (suggesting that strategic factors may explain
why plaintiffs with "non-meritorious" claims pursue their claims).
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likely when it was uncertain, and least likely when it was good. Settlement
amounts are likely to be lowest when the quality of care was good, higher
when care quality was too close to call, and highest when care quality was
poor.
The studies also show, however, that 10% to 20% of the claimants with
low-odds claims receive a settlement of some kind. Some readers may find
that troubling. Fortunately, there are several reasons for believing that this
finding does not justify serious concern. First, the discrepancy rate falls
within the range of disagreement normally found when independent
observers rate performance, even when the ratings are done entirely by
experts. From this perspective, the agreement rate is actually remarkably
good. Second, the studies generally use physicians to rate other physicians,
thus introducing a high likelihood of rater bias. Together, inter-reviewer
variability and reviewer bias could account for much, maybe all, of the 10%
to 20% payment rate in low-odds cases and the nonpayment rate in
meritorious cases. That conclusion contrasts starkly with popular perception.
Furthermore, the fact that some low-odds cases settle does not mean
that the process is working unfairly. This conclusion would only be justified
if the payments were not being discounted to reflect the weakness of the
claims being settled. The studies show that settlement size is significantly
smaller in low-odds cases than in cases with stronger evidence of negligence.
Additionally, the evidence of discounting in both settlement rates and
settlement size suggests that medical malpractice claims are discounted
twice. This phenomenon is most clearly visible in the toss-up claims, but it
may extend much more broadly.
The most likely explanation for this surplus discounting lies in the
superior bargaining power of malpractice defendants. The sources of that
bargaining power likely include superior risk tolerance, better access to
information, more experienced attorneys and insurance representatives,
easier access to expert witnesses, and the incentive to fight low-odds claims
vigorously. Defendants gain additional bargaining power from trial lawyers'
awareness that malpractice claims are very hard to win at trial, even with
strong evidence of negligence.
At the same time, however, defendants may lose some of their
bargaining superiority in cases with strong evidence of negligence.
Theoretically, at least, defendants may be willing to pay a premium to settle
their losses. That question deserves further study. On balance, however, the
evidence indicates that malpractice defendants have sufficient bargaining
power to settle the average malpractice case below its expected value.
The likely existence of a persistent asymmetry in bargaining power is a
cause for concern. So, too, is the scattered evidence that many close cases,
and perhaps some clear ones as well, are affected by strategic factors like
client appeal. Each case resolved this way confirms the perception that
malpractice litigation is an irrational lottery. Although the magnitude of
1832 [2007]
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these influences is still largely conjectural, it is no overstatement to say that
follow-up research is warranted.
The outcomes revealed by the settlement data should, however,
reassure those observers who are most concerned about its fairness to
physicians. Quality of care drives settlement outcomes. To the extent that
settlement outcomes depart from the merits, the discrepancies usually favor
malpractice defendants. Defendants have superior resources, more
experienced lawyers, and the benefit of other sources of bargaining power,
such as a repeat-player's risk neutrality and incentive for hard bargaining. As
a result, plaintiffs have more reason to complain about the system's
imperfections than defendants do.
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